Being Remarkable · Innovation · Retail

Macy’s: After Big Earnings Whiff, Here’s What It Needs To Do

Last week Macy’s missed its revenue and earnings forecast for the first quarter, sending its shares tumbling.

While the talk of a retail apocalypse is just so much hype, the intense waves of digital disruption and shifting consumer preferences assure that the future of retail–and the impact on many large and lumbering players like Macy’s–will not be evenly distributed.

We now live in a digital-first world where the line between brick & mortar sales and e-commerce is mostly a distinction without a difference. Fellow retail analyst Doug Stephens describes this new landscape as “phygital.” But whatever you label it, the consumer’s path to purchase has changed substantially–and with it the role of the store. And, increasingly, same-store sales are a largely irrelevant metric.

Nevertheless, the continuing overall poor performance of Macy’s is concerning and underscores the problems faced by many legacy brands. To get back on track, Macy’s needs to aggressively address several fundamental problems.

  • Eschew the sea of sameness. Macy’s, like so many other retailers, picked a really bad time to be so boring. Redundant, repetitive and fundamentally uninteresting product has become the norm. If customers don’t have a compelling reason (other than price) to traffic either their website or store, Macy’s will continue to hemorrhage market share.
  • It’s the experience stupid! Having remarkable and relevant products is critically important and a necessary foundation, but it’s hardly sufficient. If Macy’s continues to provide me-too visual presentation, marketing that is indistinguishable from every other department store and lackluster customer service they will continue to make price the deciding factor for most consumers.
  • Omni-channel is dead, at least in the way many have been pursuing it. Macy’s spent a lot of time and money trying to be all things to all people. Channel ubiquity with continued mediocrity is pointless. All retailers need to think about how to best harmonize and simplify the shopping across the moments of truth that matter the most for customers. Otherwise we’re just spending a lot of money to move customers between channels, not gaining relevance, share of wallet and profits.
  • Strategically re-imagine the store and the store footprint. Analysts are going to keep pushing Macy’s to close stores. And to be sure, shrinking of both store counts and store size is probably required. But the reason this is even a talking point has much more to do with the weakness of Macy’s value proposition, not their sheer number of stores. Online helps stores and stores help online. Period. Mediocre retailers that close a lot of stores are likely starting a downward spiral from which they will never return. The key is to understand the store as the hub of an ecosystem for the brand, not an asset to be merely fine-tuned for productivity. Focus on being remarkable instead of mediocre and focus on how stores strategically drive online (and vice versa) and the store closing discussion recedes into the background.
  • Don’t start a price war. With pricing pressures from Amazon, outlet stores and all the off-price players there might be a tendency to get overly focused on pricing. But don’t forget, the problem with a price war is you might win.
  • Become a testing machine. It’s easy to blame Amazon for the troubles facing the industry. But by far the biggest reason retailers are in trouble is their abject failure to innovate. Every retailer needs an R&D budget and every retailer needs to test, fail and test again. Retailers were too scared to fail and now their failing because of it. As Seth reminds us “if failure is not an option, than neither is success.”

Of course all of this is more easily said than done, particularly as Wall Street pushes for short-term fixes and Amazon continues to lower its thin margin hammer on most sectors of retail. Yet it’s hard to escape the fact that more of the same at Macy’s will only yield more of the same.

What Macy’s needs is a lot more innovation.

What investors need is just a bit more patience.

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  

Being Remarkable · Innovation · Retail

Retailers picked a really bad time to be so boring

Perhaps you’ve noticed that things are pretty tough across the retail industry these days?

Competition has never been more fierce. Average unit retail prices are getting compressed, putting ever greater downward pressure on margins. Retailers and developers that overbuilt for years are at long last facing a reckoning. Radical transparency and ease of anytime, anywhere, anyway shopping are hammering those that have failed to innovate and differentiate.

Of course, not so long ago retail brands could get away peddling average products for average people. There was a time when retailers and the brands they sold held most of the cards. There was a time when rapid industry growth could smooth over patches of mediocrity. There was a time when being just a little bit interesting could win the customer’s attention and give retailers a good shot at making the sale.

That time is over. Forever.

Now the customer is very much in charge. Now largely stagnant markets require brands to steal share to have any chance of material top line growth. Now much of retail is drowning in a sea of sameness. Now the consumer is overwhelmed by choices and the battle for share of attention is only won by the weird, the intensely relevant, the remarkable.

And yet….

And yet when entrepreneurs chased force multiplication effectiveness, many legacy brands chose to focus on incremental efficiency gains. While innovative start-ups took risks, the big retailers mostly hunkered down. As a wave of profound change was rippling through the industry, many just decided to watch and study and analyze. But mostly watch. When venture capital was piling into the bold and interesting, much of mainstream retail remained decidedly dull.

There is no shortage of unique, impactful and useful innovations that have emerged from the new age of digital disruption. It’s just that so little of it has come from traditional retailers. At precisely the time that so many retailers desperately need innovation, their cupboards are woefully bare. Confronted by me-too marketing, look-a-like stores, repetitive products and shoddy customer experiences, so many once-proud brands still have next to nothing new, differentiated and exciting to offer.

Today you can take the name off the door and Staples, Office Depot and Office Max are virtually indistinguishable. Same for Macy’s and Dillard’s, Lowe’s and Home Depot. And on and on.

The danger of death by years of inaction, thousands of tiny compromises and clinging to the false notion that a company can shrink to prosperity is now very real. Half measures have availed them nothing. Taking so few risks has turned out to be the riskiest thing retailers could have possibly chosen.

In fact, it’s hard to imagine a worse time to be so boring.

And, ironically, many of these retailers are about to experience a lot of excitement. Just not the fun kind.

Now isn’t that special?

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  

Retail

Sears’ March Toward Bankruptcy: Gradually, Then Suddenly

I get the nostalgic love for Sears.

Sears was a pioneer in catalog shopping, the creation of the department store, the boom in suburban regional malls and the advent of powerful private brands. They even sold houses through the mail. Years ago, when I was an executive at Sears, I remember sitting in focus groups and hearing some customers talk glowingly about how Sears was the only company to give them a credit card when they got out of school and how nearly everything they bought for their first home came from Sears. Kenmore. Craftsman. Diehard. All iconic.

I get the disdain for Sears too.

Consumers have suffered through years of mismanagement and, at times, what seemed like episode after episode of willful neglect. Long-term employees have seen their pride turn to embarrassment and sorrow. Investors have endured a roller coaster, with each plunge from the top growing deeper and deeper.

What I don’t get is the wishful thinking.

Despite more than a decade of steady declines in performance, despite the absence of a coherent turnaround strategy, despite the massive operating losses, some investors return to the stock like they might return to a bad love affair. In fact, since the company stated last month it had substantial doubt about its ability to survive, the stock has rallied. And some pundits continue to opine on the various ways Sears could survive as a leaner, meaner version of its storied past. Don’t be fooled.

Since Eddie Lampert still has a few things to sell to raise the mountain of cash necessary to fund ongoing operations, it’s possible he can stave off bankruptcy a bit longer. But make no mistake, the end is in sight.

It turns out that Sears is having a hard time unloading some of its few remaining significant assets, most likely because potential buyers realize their value declines along with Sears fortunes and that they might, in fact, do better in bankruptcy court.

It turns out that Sears has been quietly closing even more stores than they previously announced.

It turns out that the idea that retailers can shrink to prosperity is typically the first sign of a death spiral.

It turns out Sears has been slowly liquidating itself for years. Dead brand walking.

I’d like nothing more than to see Sears survive as a vibrant and sustainable retailer. But, sadly, all the wishful thinking in the world will not change the inevitable.

Now, whenever I think of Sears, I’m reminded of what Hemingway wrote in The Sun Also Rises. When one of the characters is asked how he went bankrupt, he replies mournfully: “Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.”

 

 A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  
Omni-channel · Retail · Store closings

Wall Street’s Misguided (And Dangerous) Fascination With Retail Store Productivity

An unprecedented number of retail store locations are closing this year and more announcements are surely coming–though perhaps not quite as many as I suggested in my April Fool’s post.

Given the lack of innovation on the part of traditional retailers, rampant overbuilding and the disruptive nature of e-commerce, this ongoing and massive consolidation of retail space was both inevitable and overdue. Yet much of the way the investor community sees the need for even more aggressive store closings is wrong and, one could argue, pretty dangerous.

One of the more ridiculous ways Wall Street firms have tried to determine the “right” number of store closings is to calculate how many locations would need to be shuttered to return various chains to their 2006 store productivity levels. A somewhat more responsible, though still alarming, analysis comes from Cowen, which focused more on the need to more closely align retail selling space supply and demand.

The most obvious problem with this type of analysis is its focus on ratios. The fact is that many stores with below average productivity are still quite profitable, particularly department stores, given their low rent factors. So while closing a lot of locations may yield a temporary productivity boost it often has a direct and immediate negative impact on earnings, which is a far better indicator of a retailer’s health.

The bigger issue is an underlying misunderstanding of the role of brick & mortar stores in retail’s new world order. Just as “same-store” sales is an increasingly irrelevant metric, so are store productivity numbers. Yes, more stores need to close. Yes, many of the stores that remain need a major rethink with regard to their size and fundamental operations. But what many still fail to grasp is how a retailer’s store footprint drives a brand’s overall health and the success of its e-commerce operations.

A given store’s productivity can be below average and decline yet still contribute to a retailer’s overall success, particularly online. Stores serve as an important–and often low cost–channel to acquire new customers. Stores serve as showrooms that drive customers online. Stores serve as fulfillment points for e-commerce operations. Stores are billboards for a retail brand. Without a compelling store footprint, a brand’s relevance will likely decline and its e-commerce business almost certainly will falter. Stated simply, store productivity numbers, taken in isolation, no longer get at the heart of a brand’s overall performance in an omnichannel world.

While there surely is merit in closing stores that drain cash and management attention, store closings can often make a bad situation worse. Ironically–as Kevin Hillstrom from MineThatData does a great job of illustrating–closings stores to respond to e-commerce growth can actually have the opposite effect. In fact, from my experience, massive store closings often initiate (or at least signal) a coming downward spiral.

Store closings are hardly the panacea that Wall Street seems to believe. And the notion that a brand can shrink its way to prosperity is typically horribly misguided. Macy’s, J.C. Penney and a host of others need to close more stores. And Sears and Kmart just need to go away. But, as I’ve said many times before, show me a retailer that is closing a lot of stores and you’ve likely shown me a retailer that doesn’t have too many stores, but a retail brand that is no longer relevant enough for the stores it has.

The danger of closing too many stores is increasingly real. The danger that struggling retailers will continue to appease Wall Street’s thirst for taking an ax to store counts instead of working on the underlying fault in their stores seems, sadly, clear and present.

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  

Customer-centric · Digital · e-commerce · Retail

‘Same-store sales’ is retail’s increasingly irrelevant metric

The retail industry has used “same-store sales” (or “comparable store sales”) as a key indicator of a retailer’s health for decades. From where I sit, its usefulness is rapidly fading, if not bordering on irrelevance.

While it remains to be seen whether retail traffic declines will last forever, most traditional retailers will struggle to grow physical store sales in the face of the significant and inexorable shift to online shopping. With few exceptions, so-called “omnichannel” retailers are experiencing flat to slightly down brick-and-mortar revenues while their e-commerce business continues to grow 10-20%. The mostly moribund department store sector points to this new reality. While overall revenues are basically going nowhere, online sales now account for over 30% of total revenue at Neiman Marcus, over 20% at Nordstrom and Saks, and some 18% at Macy’s (according to eMarketer), with the percentage growing every quarter.

What we do know, and what’s important to grasp and appreciate, is that physical stores are critical drivers of e-commerce success–and vice versa. For most retailers, a brick-and-mortar location sits at the heart of a brand’s ecosystem for a given trade area. Any retailer with a decent level of channel integration employs stores to acquire new customers, to serve, buy online, pickup in store orders (and returns) and to convert shoppers that start their shopping online but need to touch, feel or try on a product before buying. The decision of “digitally native” brands like Amazon, Bonobos, Warby Parker and others to open stores underscores this fact. Conversely, legacy retailers must be careful to avoid closing too many stores or they risk damaging the overall brand, slowing e-commerce growth and accelerating a downward spiral.

Customers shop brands, not channels or touchpoints. A robust one brand, many channels strategy requires management teams to understand precisely how the various marketing, experience and transactional channels interact to make a more relevant and remarkable whole. With this understanding, same-store sales performance may still have some utility, but “same trade area” performance–which accounts for all sales regardless of purchase channel within the influence area of a store–becomes a far more interesting and useful metric. Critically, it also provides the basis for understanding the drivers of customer segment level performance at a more granular and actionable level.

Rapidly declining same-store sales performance may suggest the need for aggressive action, including shuttering stores. Unquestionably, the great de-leveraging of retail store economics is cause for real concern. But without a broader view of how digital commerce and the in-store shopping experience work together, an obsession with same-store sales performance will inevitably lead to some very dumb decisions indeed.

 A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts here.  
Fashion · Luxury · Omni-channel · Retail

Should Hudson Bay Buy Neiman Marcus? The Case For And Against.

Tuesday morning the Neiman Marcus Group reported another quarter of disappointing financial results and announced that it was going to “explore strategic alternatives.”

To be sure, some of Neiman’s problems are idiosyncratic, largely owing to a botched systems implementation and a now crushing debt load taken on in a 2013 private equity buyout. Yet the brand’s continuing struggles also underscore how luxury retail has hit the wall and how it now seems increasingly likely that the storied company may need to run into the arms of yet another owner.

Recent reports have suggested that the Hudson’s Bay Company was hot on the trail of Macy’s. Yet to many, the notion that HBC would acquire a badly wounded company several times its size, seemed a bit crazy. But the rationale for HBC–the owner of Saks Fifth Avenue and Gilt–to acquire Neiman’s seems, at least at face value, more strategically sound and (perhaps) more easily financed.

When I worked for Neiman Marcus as the head of strategy and corporate marketing we took a hard look at acquiring Saks. Years later, many of the pros and cons of combining the #1 and #2 luxury department stores remain the same.

The Case For

It seems increasingly obvious that the luxury department store sector is quite mature. While e-commerce is growing (now representing 31% of Neiman’s total revenues), most of that is now merely channel shift. Moreover, there are virtually no new full-line store opportunities for either Saks or Neiman’s, and the jury remains out whether or not US brands can find a meaningful number of store openings outside their home markets. Shifting demographics also do not bode well for long-term sector growth.

Faced with this reality, consolidation makes a lot of sense. If Saks were to merge with Neiman’s there would be considerable cost savings from combining many areas of operations. Rationalization of the supply chain would yield material savings as well. Managing the two brands as a cohesive portfolio would allow for optimization of marketing spending and promotional activity. There might even be some benefits from combining buying power to extract greater margins from vendors. Less tangible, but potentially meaningful, is the ability to cascade best practices from each organization.

The more interesting benefits could come from addressing store overlaps. As the market matures and more sales move online, there will be a growing number of trade areas (and specific mall locations) where Saks and Neiman’s going head-to-head only waters down the profitability of each respective location. Selectively closing stores and redeploying that real estate could drive up the remaining locations’ profitability dramatically, while unlocking the underlying real estate value of certain locations. All of which certainly plays into Richard Baker’s (HBC’s Chairman) strengths.

The Case Against

By far the most challenging element of any buyout of Neiman’s by HBC (or by anyone for that matter) would be the price and the related financing. Neiman’s was sold in 2013 for $6 billion dollars and still carries about $5 billion in debt. Since the buyout the company’s EBITDA has gone south, with no prospect for an imminent major turnaround. Given the maturity of the sector and the company’s recent weak operating performance, it’s hard to see why anyone would pay the sort of multiple that would make the current equity and/or debt owners whole.

Unless the real estate value can be unlocked in a transformative way, the only rationale for a merger hinges on the ability to generate operational efficiencies and optimize trade area by trade area market performance. With regard to the former, this isn’t trivial. The Saks and Neiman’s cultures are very different. To say one is very New York and the other is very Texas merely hints at the challenges. It’s easy to sketch out the synergies on paper. Making them actually happen is another thing entirely.

With regard to the latter, the fact is that Saks and Neiman’s are very similar concepts (though Neiman’s historically has been operated far better). When I was at Neiman’s we struggled with how we would operate two virtually identical brands often operating in the same mall–or in places like San Francisco, Beverly Hills, Boston and Chicago–just down the street. Even if we could get out of a lease (or sell the store), would closing a shared location actually be accretive to earnings? If we continued to go head-to-head could we shift the positioning of each brand enough to actually grow market share and profits. Ultimately, other issues trumped this particular concern, but this issue isn’t trivial either and the degree to which it is important mostly comes back to the ultimate price to get a deal done.

Without access to proprietary data it’s impossible to completely assess the likelihood of an HBC/Neiman’s deal. But it seems increasingly likely that something dramatic needs to happen with Neiman’s capital structure and it’s difficult to imagine how another leveraged buyout gets done with private equity sponsors. And it’s hard to see another strategic buyer that makes much sense. More and more, HBC looks like the only game in town.

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts here.

Being Remarkable · Luxury · Retail

Luxury retail hits the wall

For a long time, the conventional wisdom has been that the luxury market was largely impervious to the ups and down of the economy. Yet recent results suggest otherwise and even with an improving macro-economic picture and booming stock market, most U.S.-based luxury retail brands continue to struggle.

A little over a week ago, reports surfaced that Neiman Marcus was looking to restructure its debt after a series of disappointing quarters. While Neiman Marcus faces unique challenges owing to high leverage from its 2013 buyout and a botched systems implementation, they are also being hit by a general malaise affecting the sector. HBC’s Saks Fifth Avenue division revenues have stalled during the past year. Nordstrom, which was once a shining star in the retail pantheon, has seen five straight quarters of declines in its full-line stores. Tiffany and Kors are among other brands facing similar declines. So what’s going on here?

The most common explanations for faltering performance have been the strong dollar’s impact on foreign tourism and a weak oil market. To be sure, these factors have not been helpful. But the problems in the luxury market go deeper, particularly among the department store players. Even an improvement in foreign tourism or the oil market are unlikely to return the sector to its former glory. Here’s why:

  • Little new customer growth. Other than through e-commerce, luxury retailers have had a tough time with customer acquisition for many years. With e-commerce maturing–and most recent reported gains merely channel shift–unfavorable demographics (see below) and very few new store openings, luxury brands are struggling to replace the customers they are losing.
  • Little or no transaction growth. While not widely appreciated, most of the comparable store growth in luxury retail has come through prices increases, not growth in transactions. To change this dynamic companies need to appeal to a wider range of customers and that’s proven difficult to execute in an intensely competitive environment. Brands must be also be careful not to dilute their brand relevance and differentiation in an attempt to cast a wider net.
  • Unfavorable demographics. Affluent baby boomers have propped up the sector for more than a decade. But as customers get older they tend to spend less overall, and quite a bit less on luxury in particular. Baby boomers are slowly but surely aging out of the segment. Gen X is a smaller cohort and there is little evidence they will spend as much as the boomers. Over the longer term, millennials will need to make up for the boomers who, to put it bluntly, will be dying off. Most studies suggest millennials will be more price-sensitive and less status conscious then then the cohorts ahead of them. This is a major long-term headwind.
  • Growing competition. Strict control over distribution largely insulates the luxury market from intense price competition and having to go head-to-head with Amazon. Nevertheless, full-price luxury is increasingly being cannibalized by retailers’ own growing off-price divisions. Luxury brand manufacturers are also aggressively investing in their own direct-to-consumer efforts by improving their e-commerce operations and continuing to open their own stores. Luxury websites like Net-a-Porter are gaining share of a no longer expanding pie.
  • Shifts in spending. Affluent consumers continue to value experiences and services over things–and are allocating their spending accordingly. Perhaps this multi-year trend will start to reverse itself. Perhaps.
  • The omni-channel migration dilemma. Luxury retailers are spending mightily on all things omni-channel, as they must to remain competitive. But it’s incredibly expensive to create a more integrated customer experience. The better a retailer becomes at this, the more business shifts from physical stores to digital. Most often this is not accretive to earnings as brick & mortar economics get deleveraged and online shopping is plagued by high returns and expensive logistics.
  • Looming over-capacity. While the luxury sector does not face the pressure to close stores that the broader market does, stagnant sales and a continued shift to digital channels will start to put more and more pressure on full-line store economics. Moreover, there is growing evidence that the high-end off-price sector is approaching saturation. The rationale for a Saks and Neiman merger may start to make more sense and some pruning of locations seems inevitable.

Notwithstanding the capital structure issues Neiman Marcus must deal with, the luxury market does not face nearly the same immediate challenges that many parts of retail must address. Nevertheless, there is mounting evidence that the sector’s struggles go beyond foreign currency woes and the vagaries of the oil market.

Profound change is coming to luxury as well and most of the headwinds simply aren’t going away.

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts here.