Being Remarkable · Collapse of the middle · Retail

Retail earnings: The best of times, the worst of times

This is a big earnings period for retailers. As the reports roll in, it’s increasingly clear that it’s both the best of times and the worst of times for retail.

While performance overall is, on average, much better than a year ago, what continues to come into sharper relief are three inescapable conclusions. First, as I have been saying for years, the idea that physical retail is dying is abject nonsense. Second, retailers that are stuck in a cycle of boring are getting crushed, and the middle is collapsing. Third, as our friends at Deloitte have recently outlined in depth, the bifurcation of retail is becoming more pronounced. The overall conclusion is that the difference between the haves and the have nots is ever more distinct.

On the first point, strong performance from multiple brick-and-mortar dominant retailers, including Target and Home Depot, underscores that stores are not only going to be around for a long time, they will continue to have the dominant share of retail in many categories for the foreseeable future.

On my second point, significant underperformance ( JC Penney ), store closings ( Sears Holdings ) and bankruptcies (Toys “R” Us) continue to be concentrated among those retailers that have failed to carve out a meaningful position toward the more value, convenience-oriented end of the spectrum or, conversely, to move in a more focused, upscale experiential strategic direction. Those that continue to swim in a sea of sameness edge ever closer to the precipice. Increasingly, it’s death in the relentlessly boring middle.

The great bifurcation point, of course, is related to this phenomenon. Despite the retail apocalypse narrative, solidly executing retailers at either end of the spectrum continue to perform well. Sales, profits and store openings are robust at TJX Companies , Walmart and many others that play on the value end. A similar story can be painted for the premium, service-oriented retail brands such as Nordstrom and Williams-Sonoma.

As the scorecards continue to come in, there are a few key things we should bear in mind. The most important is that better is not the same as good. While positive sales and expanding margins certainly beat the alternative, the improved performance at brands like Macy’s and Kohl’s should not reflexively make us think that all is now well. Their sales growth is more or less in line with overall category growth. So there isn’t any reason to believe they are growing relative market share, which is generally a pretty good proxy for improving customer relevance.

Second, we should expect decent earnings leverage with improved sales, given the relatively fixed cost nature of the business. It’s more important to put the margin performance in the context of “best in breed” competitors. Here, most in the gang of most improved still fall short.

Third, a rising tide tends to raise all ships. This happens to be a particularly good time for consumer spending. It’s anybody’s guess if, and how long, retail expenditures will meaningfully exceed the rate of inflation.

From a more strategic, longer-term perspective, we need to sort out what is at the core of improving outcomes. If it’s riding the wave of a particularly ebullient economic cycle, that’s wonderful but not likely sustainable. If it’s starting to realize more fully the benefits of major technology investments, asset redeployment and/or picking up share from a rash of store closings on the part of competitors, that’s also nice, but those gains are likely to plateau fairly quickly. If margin improvement comes from big cost reductions, those often are more one-time gains and may ultimately weaken a given retailer’s competitive position over time.

What really matters, of course, is that most of the gains are coming from fundamentally being more intensely relevant and remarkable than the customer’s other choices. Viewed from this lens, many retailers’ improved results are necessary but far from sufficient.

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  

September 6th I will be in New York for the Retail Influencer Network Kick-off.  On September 19th I’ll be speaking at Total Retail Tech in Dallas. The following Monday I’m headed to Austin to do the opening keynote at the Next Conference.

Being Remarkable · Branding · Retail

Is IHOb a big nothing burger?

The teasing announcement that IHOP (the brand formerly known as the International House of Pancakes) would change its name to IHOb sent the interwebs wild. In the days leading up to what some seemed to take as earth-shaking, potentially vortex-shifting, news speculation was rife as to what the “b” stood for. Bacon? Breakfast? Burrito? Bohemianism? Blockchain? So many intriguing possibilities!

One intrepid investigative reporter ultimately engaged in what is sure to be Pulitzer-winning work by simply walking into a local IHOP, where he immediately discovered some signs that seemed to solve the mystery: B is for burgers.

Shockingly, once we got the official word, it turned out to be merely a publicity stunt designed to highlight the chain’s new focus on meals other than breakfast. So the hemming and hawing about how bone-headed the name change was going to be then shifted to challenging the wisdom of the menu refocus or being offended by what some took as a desperate ploy for social media attention. The Wall Street Journal even weighed in with the deeply disturbing news that many customers don’t even know what IHOP stands for. It also turns out that there are quite a few folks disgusted by the lack of global sensibility in the menu despite “International” being right there in the restaurant’s name.

Of course, virtually all of this is noise. The publicity stunt will soon be forgotten. The people that like to get their pancakes at IHOb, er, I mean IHOP, will probably keep getting their pancakes there—or if they want to lean into the International part, their Belgian waffles or, if feeling especially frisky, their French Toast. The burgers will turn out to be a winner, or not. And the Earth will keep orbiting the Sun.

Having said this there are, in fact, at least two important and instructive things to take away from this episode.

First, a name is not the same thing as a brand. A name is what we call something. A brand is something different entirely—and far more meaningful. I like Seth Godin’sdefinition: “a brand is the set of expectations, memories, stories and relationships that, taken together, account for a consumer’s decision to choose one product or service over another.” Often we get lost in the literal naming of something. But a powerful brand transcends mere description.

What comes to mind when we think about Restoration Hardware? Or Pottery Barn? Or Crate & Barrel? Or Banana Republic? When we stop to think about the names of those stores as representations of what they do today, they seem not only pretty silly, but downright misleading. It doesn’t matter. The customer experience over time is what defines the brand. So enjoy your Pepsi while Googling more about this.

Second, the challenges of IHOP speak to broader issues that many legacy brands face. There are great advantages to being known for a clearly defined set of expectations, memories, stories and relationships. Yet that often sets up real limitations and barriers to a brand’s necessary growth and evolution.

Mature brands typically need to retain their long-term historically valuable customer cohorts and attract and grow entirely new segments. It’s part of what I call the “customer trapeze,” and it isn’t easy to execute. The more brands lean into cultivating younger, trendier customers the more they likely risk alienating older, more classic ones. The more you start to push products you aren’t known for, the more you call into question whether you are serious about the core of what made you distinctive in the first place.

The thing to remember is that stagnation in the face of shifting consumer desires and growing, often disruptive, competition is, best case, irrelevance; worst case, it’s death. Many brands convince themselves that embracing radical change is risky, when in fact failing to evolve is the most risky thing a company can possibly do. We don’t have to look very long and hard to come up with dozens of examples of once-leading brands that failed to experiment and innovate and are paying a heavy price today.

So maybe the IHOb thing is just a goofy publicity stunt. Maybe the folks at IHOP are kidding themselves that they can become a meaningful player in a world that’s crowded with all manner of burger joints and casual-dining options. Maybe this is all just much ado about nothing.

Yet in a world where lots of legacy brands sat around and watched the last 15 or 20 years happen to them and now find themselves inching toward the precipice, IHOP should at least be applauded for trying something new.

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  For more on my speaking and workshops go here.

Being Remarkable · Reimagining Retail · Store closings

It’s just about time for full-on panic at J.C. Penney

It’s been a long sad slog for J.C. Penney. In 2011, after more than a decade of (at best) mediocre performance, the company brought in Ron Johnson from Apple as its new CEO. In what some saw as a bold attempt at transformation — and others saw as a misguided Hail Mary pass — retail’s latest savior changed just about everything all at once, and to put it mildly, the results were disastrous. Sales plummeted by about a third, the stock tanked, and Johnson was eventually shown the door.

Former CEO Mike Ullman returned to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating situation — which he did. Then in August 2015, Home Depot’s Marvin Ellison was brought in as the new CEO. In the more than five years since the Ron Johnson debacle, Penney’s has tried many things to claw back lost market share, improve profitability and become more relevant for a new generation. Very little of it has gained any traction. The stock, which traded around $40 when Johnson joined — and in the $20s when he left — sunk to just above $2 after a hugely disappointing quarterly earning report and the announcement that Ellison was leaving to join Lowe’s.

This is bad. Very bad. And I will be the first to admit that I am a bit surprised.

While it is clear that Penney’s is in some ways the poster child for “the collapse of the middle” that I frequently speak about, there were reasons to believe that Penney’s was well positioned to regain meaningful market share.

First, under Johnson, the company essentially fired one-third of its customers through a series of bone-headed moves. While it is difficult to win back customers in an intensely competitive market, I thought a decent subset would return once the obvious blunders were fixed. For the most part, it hasn’t happened.

Second, Sears, its most similar on-the-mall competitor, has closed hundreds of stores in the past few years — surely Penney’s would pick up a fair share. But if it has, it’s not so obvious.

Third, in addition to continuing to expand its successful Sephora in-store shops, Penney’s has added new products and services (including home appliances and mattresses) to attract new customers, drive incremental traffic and improve store productivity. So where’s the beef?

Fourth, after being a laggard in e-commerce and omni-channel, Penney’s has taken steps to elevate these capabilities. Yet the growth hasn’t followed.

Lastly, the categories in which it competes have performed pretty solidly the past few quarters. Penney’s failure to grow revenue at least 3-4% means it is losing share.

So Penney’s now finds itself in a situation where it has been engaged in years of cost cutting and store closings. There is very little gas left in that particular tank. The problem is no longer fundamentally about cost position or store footprint; it is about customer relevance and revenue. Penney’s finds itself in a situation where competitors have ceded hundreds of millions of dollars of sales through store closings, yet apparently little has migrated to its benefit. Penney’s finds itself in the middle of the best year in recent retail industry history, yet is struggles to keep pace. And now its CEO elects to leave.

It simply won’t get any easier from here.

While the seemingly imminent demise of Sears will provide incremental market share opportunities, we should not lose sight of the fact that the moderate department store sector continues to decline with no end in sight. Sales of online apparel are expected to double within the next few years, which will continue to pressure the economics of brick-and-mortar retailers that don’t execute a well-harmonized multi-channel strategy. Younger shoppers will become increasingly important to the overall fortunes of just about any retailer, and Penney’s has done little to contemporize its brand. And while Penney’s may have a few stores to close, mass store shutterings are almost certain to accelerate its decline. The best barometer of success going forward is robust trade area growth, derived from stable to slightly positive comp store sales and strong double-digit e-commerce growth.

Given the bifurcation of retail and the death of boring, J.C. Penney is a long way from being a remarkable and compelling retailer. Yet the positive retail cycle we are in and the likely shuttering of hundreds of directly competitive stores over the next six to 18 months will give the more-than-100-year-old brand an unprecedented opportunity to grab share. If it cannot improve its performance dramatically over the next few quarters, the issue won’t be whether a transformation is ever possible; it will be whether the once-stored retailer will even be around at any reasonable scale much longer.

And if that doesn’t incite panic, I don’t know what will.

jc-penney-store-1200xx2048-1152-0-107

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  

On June 15 I will be doing a keynote at The Shopper Insights & Retail Activation Conference in Chicago.  For more on my speaking and workshops go here.

Being Remarkable · Reimagining Retail · Retail

Is this the beginning of a department store renaissance? Eh, not so much.

Nearly two weeks ago Macy’s beat quarterly sales and earnings expectations and many on Wall Street promptly lost their mind. Same story with Dillard’s. Then Kohl’s followed up with a similarly surprising upside report that led some to conclude that maybe, just maybe, the long-beleaguered department store sector might be seeing a resurgence or—dare we say it out loud?—the beginning of a renaissance.

Alas, this rising ebullience seems far more driven by a mix of hope, misunderstanding and a heaping side order of denial than any compelling evidence that the tide is turning in any meaningful or sustainable way. Once again we are in real danger of confusing better with good.

To be sure, both Macy’s and Kohl’s sales and profits were much improved over last year. Yet their performance must be viewed from the perspective of both short-term factors and longer-term realities. On the clearly positive side there is solid evidence that both struggling retailers are executing better. In Macy’s case, inventory looks to be well managed (yielding fewer markdowns) and efforts to capture cost efficiencies appear to be paying dividends. A few targeted strategic initiatives, including Kohl’s partnership with Amazon, seem to be driving some incremental business.

With a bit more context, however, these results aren’t really all that stellar. And they most definitely are not yet strong indicators of any substantive turnaround. Notably, both retailers’ sales benefitted significantly from the move of a major promotional event into the quarter. Without this shift, same-store sales would have increased only about 1.7% at Macy’s, and Kohl’s would have been more or less flat (not that this metric is all that useful anymore anyway). That is neither keeping up with inflation nor maintaining pace with the overall growth of the broader categories in which they compete. The optimist might see losing market share at a slightly slower rate as a win. The realist opines that there is a lot more work to do to go from decidedly lackluster to objectively good.

The other thing to bear in mind is that J.C. Penney and Sears (and now Bon-Ton) have been leaking volume through store closings and comparable store sales declines. It’s hard to imagine that Macy’s and Kohl’s have not benefitted materially from this dynamic. While J.C. Penney’s future is increasingly uncertain, any upside from Bon-Ton will be short-lived. Sears looks to be the gift that keeps giving, though likely for only a few quarters more as I expect that Sears will close substantially all of its full-line stores within the next year. While this creates one-time market share gaining opportunities and fixed cost leverage, once the dust settles two factors will come into sharper relief.

The first is the contributions from a strong economy. Recent macro-economic factors have been generally positive for the product categories in which Macy’s and Kohl’s compete. Whether there will continue to be some wind beneath the sails of U.S. retail more broadly—and for the moderate-priced apparel, accessories and home categories in particular—remains to be seen. Clearly my crystal ball is no better than anyone else’s—and maybe worse. But my best guess is that both the economy and the jump ball for market share occasioned by department store consolidation peaks within the next few quarters.

The second factor that looms large seems to be the one Wall Street forgets. The moderate department store sector has been in decline for a long, long time. Some of this has to do with evolving customer trends. Some with stagnant income growth. Some with the rise of superior competing business models: initially category killers, then off-price and dollar stores and now, increasingly, Amazon. And some with more than a fair share of self-inflicted wounds. Regardless, the entire moderate sector, to varying degrees, is stuck in the vast, undifferentiated and boring middle. A somewhat better version of mediocre may the first step on an eventual path to greatness, but it may be just that: a first step.

Lift the veil from a quarter or two of slightly above average performance and the drivers of broader share losses (and related widespread shuttering of stores) continue unabated. Off-price and dollar stores, which in recent years have accounted for the biggest drain on Macy’s, Kohl’s et al., are opening up hundreds of new stores at the same time they are starting to turn up their digital game. Amazon is becoming a bigger factor everyday—and it has yet to make a big push into physical stores. Even if any of the leading department stores miraculously became more innovative and customer relevant they would continue to face significant headwinds. Bottom line: show me someone who believes that a transformation of mid-priced department stores is possible in the foreseeable future and you’ve probably clued me into who has been providing Eddie Lampert with his strategic consulting advice.

As the middle continues to collapse, it is now completely a market-share game. The near-term good news is that Macy’s and Kohl’s competition has made it relatively easy to grab some share. The near-term good news is that a generally healthy economy tends to raise the tide for all. The near-term good news is that Macy’s and Kohl’s operating discipline allows them to convert relatively small sales increases into nice incremental profit opportunities.

The bad news is neither one of them goes from incrementally better to demonstrably good until they make much more substantive and fundamental strategic changes that move them from mostly boring to truly remarkable. Neither brand has spelled out what that looks like in any compelling fashion. And once designed, getting there from here is no small task. Until then, it is way too early to declare victory.

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  

On June 15 I will be doing a keynote at The Shopper Insights & Retail Activation Conference in Chicago. Contact me for a special discount. For more on my speaking and workshops go here.

A really bad time to be boring · Being Remarkable · Retail

Choosing the race to the bottom

It turns out that most retailers that find themselves at–or edging ever closer to–the precipice have much more of a revenue problem than having expenses that are fundamentally too high. And yet so many relentlessly focus on cutting costs, often leading to a further reduction in customer service.

It turns out that when the major lever a company has to drive the top line is deep discounting, they mostly end up attracting the promiscuous shopper while simultaneously lowering the margin on the customers who once were willing to pay a higher price. Over the long-term, that math never works.

And while it may be true that retailers can often do the same amount of business with a smaller footprint, it turns out that many of brands that are closing outlets in droves don’t actually have too many stores. Instead they have a value proposition that isn’t sufficiently customer relevant for the stores they have. Shuttering locations en masse may seem like the wise move to improve profits, yet it is typically the first sign of a downward spiral.

By now it should be obvious that trying to stake out a winning position by being a slightly better version of boring is untenable. The notion of cost cutting your way to prosperity is a fool’s errand.

Once we fully accept that selling average products to average people no longer works and that to make meaningful progress we must zero in on solving the right problem, we realize that for most of us the choice is clear–or should be.

We can choose to treat different customers differently, create intensely relevant and remarkable experiences and tell a story that deserves to be told time and time again.

Or, we can choose to join the race to the bottom.

Just remember, as Seth reminds us, “the problem with the race to the bottom is you might win.”

the-problem-with-the-race-to-the-bottom-is-that-you-might-win-quote-1

A really bad time to be boring · Being Remarkable · Omni-channel · Reinventing Retail · Retail

Upcoming webinar: “Omni-channel is dead. Long live omni-channel.”

Please join me next Wednesday February 14th at 1pm US Eastern for a free 30 minute webinar on the future of omni-channel retailing. I’ll be joined by Rob Poratti from IBM Watson Commerce. You can pre-register here.

In other news, I’ll be heading to Melbourne, Australia at the end of the month for InsideRetailLive.

I’ve also recently added two new keynote speaking gigs, both in Chicago. I’ll be sharing thoughts from my forthcoming book “A Really Bad Time To Be Boring: Reinventing Retail In The Age Of Amazon.”

June 13-15   Shopper Insights & Activation Conference 

November 7-9   eRetailer Summit

For more on my speaking and workshops go here.

Webinar_Omnichannel-Dead_1-12-2018 (2)

Being Remarkable · Digital-first · Omni-channel · Retail

A baker’s dozen of provocative retail predictions for 2018

2017 was one of the most transformative years for the retail industry that I can remember. 2018 is likely to be just as wild and woolly, albeit in somewhat different ways. Here’s my attempt to go beyond the obvious and go out on the limb just a bit.

  1. Physical retail isn’t dead. Boring retail is. A lot of stores closed in 2017. Often forgotten is that a lot opened as well. Many stores will close in 2018. Many will open as well. By this time next year roughly 90% of all retail will still be done in physical stores, so please can we shut up already about the “retail apocalypse.” The train left the station years ago on products that could be better delivered digitally. What’s happened most recently has everything to do with a long over-due correction of overbuilding and the collapse of irrelevant, unremarkable retail. The seismic changes in retail have laid waste to the mediocre and those that have been treading water in a sea of sameness. Great retail brands (Apple, Costco, Ulta, Sephora, TJX, etc.) continue to thrive, despite their overwhelming reliance on brick & mortar stores. Ignore the nonsense. Eschew the boring. Chase remarkable.
  2. Consolidation accelerates. In many aspects of today’s retail world, scale is more important than ever and this will continue to drive a robust pace of mergers and acquisitions. In some cases, capacity must come out of the market to create any chance for decent profits to return. The department store space is a great example. Moreover, large, well capitalized companies will take advantage of asset “fire sales” or technology plays to complement their skills and accelerate their growth.
  3. Honey, I shrunk the store. Small is the new black in many ways. Many chains will continue to right-size their store fleets to better align with future demand. Others will reformat or relocate to smaller footprints to better address the role of online shopping. We can also expect to see more small format stores as a way to cost effectively extend customer reach and further penetrate key customer segments.
  4. The difference between buying and shopping takes center stage. Buying is task-oriented, more chore than cherished, and is typically focused on seeking out great assortments, the lowest price and maximum convenience. This is where e-commerce has made the greatest inroads. Increasingly, Amazon dominates buying. Shopping is different. It’s experiential, it’s social, tactile–and the role of physical stores is often paramount. The trouble is when retail brands don’t understand the distinction and invest their energies trying to out-Amazon Amazon in a race to the bottom. And, as Seth reminds us, the problem with the race to the bottom is you might win. Or worse, finish second.
  5. Amazon doubles down on brick & mortar. For Amazon to continue it’s hyper-growth–and eventually make some decent profits–it needs to go deeper into the world of shopping vs. buying (see above). And this means greater physical store presence, particularly in some key categories like apparel and home. In addition to opening its own stores I expect at least one major acquisition of a significant “traditional” retail brand.
  6. Private brands and monobrands shine. A key part of winning in the age of Amazon and digital disruption is finding ways to amplify points of differentiation. Most often this can be done through product and experience. With the over-distribution of many national brands and the ease of price comparison, more and more smart retailers are looking for ways to differentiate on unique product. For some–including Amazon–deepening their commitment to private brands can be a source of competitive advantage. Well positioned monobrand retailers like Uniqlo, H&M, Primark and Warby Parker also will continue to steal share from less compelling multi-brand stores.
  7. Digital and analog learn to dance. As much attention as e-commerce gets it turns out digital channels’ influence on brick & mortar shopping is far more important for most brands. In fact, many retailers report that more that 60-75% of their physical store sales are influenced by a digital channel, hence the rise of the term “digital-first” retail. Side note: anyone who has adopted this term in the last 12 months has simply informed us that they were paying no attention to what has been going on in retail for nearly a decade. Regardless, clearly in-store technology must evolve to support this rapidly evolving world. Yet as much as technology can enhance the shopping experience the role of an actual human being in making the customer experience intensely relevant and remarkable should not be forgotten. Many retailers would be wise to see sales associates as assets to invest in, not expenses to be optimized.
  8. The great bifurcation widens. And it’s death in the middle. It’s been true for some time that the future of retail will not be evenly distributedWhat became abundantly clear in 2017 is how different the results have been between the industry’s have’s and have not’s. At one end of the spectrum retailers with a strong pricing story, from dollar stores to off-price to Costco and Walmart, did well. At the other end of the spectrum, many luxury brands and well focused specialty retailers continued to thrive. Meanwhile the fortunes of Sears, Macys, JC Penney and others who failed to get out of the undifferentiated and relentlessly boring middle diverged markedly. This will end badly.
  9. Omnichannel is dead. Digital-first, harmonized retail rules. Too many retailers chased being everywhere and ended up being nowhere. The search for ubiquity led to disjointed, poorly prioritized efforts that fattened the wallets of consultants but often did little to create what most customers want and value. The point is not to be everywhere, but to be relevant and remarkable where it matters, to understand the leverage in the customer journey and to root out the friction and amplify those elements of the experience that make the most difference. Most customer journeys will start in a digital channel (and more and more this means on a mobile device) and the challenge is to make all the potentially disparate elements of the shopping experience sing together as a harmonious whole.
  10. Pure plays say “buh-bye.” With rare exception, so-called “digitally native” brands were always a bad idea. Despite venture capitalists initial enthusiasm–and Walmart’s wet kiss acquisitions–only a handful of pure-play models had any chance to scale profitably. And many arrogantly declared they’d never open stores (I’m looking at you Bonobos and Everlane) when anyone who understood the high cost of returns and customer acquisition saw a physical store strategy (or bankruptcy) as inevitable. We’ve already seen some high profile blowups and more are surely on the way (Wayfair? Every meal delivery company?). This year the shakeout will continue and it will become clear that for the brands that survive most of their future growth will be driven by brick & mortar stores not e-commerce.
  11. The returns problem is ready for its close up. Product returns were the bane of direct-to-consumer brands well before e-commerce was a thing. Lands’ End, Victoria’s Secret, Neiman Marcus and many others regularly experienced return rates in excess of 30% from their catalog divisions. When you could actually charge for delivery this was a problem, but not necessarily the achilles heel. The near ubiquity of free returns & exchanges may be a consumer bonanza, but it drives a lot of expensive behavior and makes much of e-commerce unprofitable. Customers regularly order multiple colors and/or sizes of the same item hoping that one of them will fit or be to their taste. The retailer then eats the expense of some or all of the items coming back, including handling costs and often additional merchandise markdowns (which can be especially ugly for seasonal or fashion items). The disproportionate growth of e-commerce means outsized growth and expense for retailers. It’s not sustainable. Consider yourself warned.
  12. “Cool” technology underwhelms. There is plenty of incredibly useful technology that continues to transform retail, notably around mobile, predictive analytics and the like. There is also a lot that ranges between gimmicky and not yet ready for prime time. Augmented and virtual reality? Wearables? IotT? Blockchain? Digital mirrors? Someday, maybe. 2018? Not so much.
  13. The search for scarcity and the quest for remarkable ramps up. As most things came to be available to just about anyone, anytime, anywhere, anyway, access to great product was no longer scarce. As various marketplaces, peer-to-peer review sites and various forms of social media made data about product quality, reliable alternatives and pricing universally available, information was no longer scarce. As various tools emerged to put the customer in charge, the retail brand’s advantages were diminished and the power of the channel started to evaporate. It’s really hard to get folks to pay for what is widely available for free. And it turns out the moat that protected a lot of brands has dried up and been paved over. Good enough no longer is. The brands that will not only survive, but actually thrive in 2018 and beyond, will deliver consistently and remarkably on things that are highly valued by customers, can be seen as scarce and can be made proprietary to that brand. It’s not easy, but frankly, more times than not, it’s the only choice.

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  

For information on keynote speaking and workshops please go here.

Being Remarkable · Omni-channel · Reinventing Retail · Retail

My top ten Forbes posts of the year

Earlier this year I had the honor of joining Forbes as a retail contributor.

As is my tradition, I’ll publish my top ten list from my blog right after the New Year. For now, here are my most popular articles on Forbes during 2017. One thing is for sure: folks were interested in hearing me opine about Sears. I have a feeling that window is closing.

  1. Sears Must Think We’re Stupid Or Gullible: Here’s Why
  2. Sears: Is The End Finally In Sight For The World’s Slowest Liquidation Sale?
  3. Here’s Who Amazon Could Buy Next And Why It Probably Won’t Be Nordstrom
  4. The Inconvenient Truth About e-Commerce: It’s Largely Unprofitable
  5. Omnichannel Is Dead. Long live Omnichannel.
  6. Sears March Toward Bankruptcy: Gradually, Then Suddenly
  7. Sears: Dead Brand Walking
  8. Reports Of JC Penney’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated 
  9. Luxury Retail Hits The Wall
  10. With Kenmore Deal Amazon Is A Winner. For Sears, Not So Much

And this one goes to 11: Hype-y Holidays: Black Friday And Other Nonsense

Thanks for reading and engaging this past year.

A most happy and peaceful New Year to all!

Top.Ten_

 

A really bad time to be boring · Being Remarkable · Retail

Holiday 2017: The fault in our stores

By all accounts this holiday shopping season looks to be pretty solid overall–perhaps the best since 2010. Aggregate sales will likely be up between 3.5% and 4.0%. E-commerce year-over-year growth will come in around 17%. Retailers’ inventories seem to be generally in good shape, which should allow most to deliver strong gross margin performance. And despite the silly retail apocalypse narrative, I’ll even venture to say that sales in physical stores will show a slight increase.

Of course a given retailer’s mileage will vary; often considerably. The future of retail will not be evenly distributed. As we’ve seen in recent years, the fortunes of the have’s and have not’s continue to diverge. For more and more retail brands it’s death in the middle.

While we can be certain that the coming weeks will be filled with stories dissecting this season’s winners and losers, the truth is we already know the outcome. The retailers that consistently offer a relevant and remarkable value proposition–and execute well against it–are growing, making good money and (hold on to your hat) opening stores–sometimes a lot of them. We see this across a spectrum of price points. Off-price retail, warehouse clubs and dollar stores doing well; great, typically higher-end, specialty stores gaining share and delivering solid profits.

The simplistic notion that physical retail is going away is clearly flat out wrong. The continuing rise of Amazon does not spell doom for all of retail. The rapid growth of e-commerce hardly represents the death knell for traditional brick & mortar stores. For every Sears, Radio Shack and Borders, there is a Best Buy, Walmart or Nordstrom. The failed (and failing) retailers are the ones that did not innovate, that thought the physical store and e-commerce were the channels, when the customer was the channel all along. Somehow they believed they could cost cut their way to prosperity instead of evolving to where the customer was moving. Lower costs and drastic pruning of store locations mean precisely nothing if when the dust settles you are still drowning in a sea of sameness.

Physical retail is not dying. Boring retail is.

The fault is not with stores, it’s with stores that are irrelevant and unremarkable.

The fault in our stores lies in seeking to be everywhere and ending up being nowhere. The fault in our stores lies in aiming to be everything to everybody and being mostly “meh” to just about everyone. The fault in our stores emanates from retailers failing to understand the customer journey and committing to ruthlessly rooting out friction points and amplifying the experiences that really matter along that journey. The fault in our stores rests in retailers unwillingness to experiment and take prudent risks.

The shift of power to the consumer is not going away. What was once scarce rarely is anymore. Most customer journeys will start in a digital channel. Seamless integration across channels is now table-stakes. Good enough no longer is. Today’s basis for competition is being redefined, often radically.

As it turns out it’s an especially bad time to be boring.

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  For information on keynote speaking and workshops please go here.

A really bad time to be boring · Being Remarkable · Reinventing Retail

Retail reality: It’s death in the middle

I first pointed to what I called “retail’s great bifurcation”literally two years ago today. Though it wasn’t the first time that I had observed what I saw as the impending collapse of the middle. I began writing and speaking about that during 2011.

As we emerged from the financial crisis it seemed clear to me that retail brands were faced with the proverbial fork in the road. A strategy of being just about everything to everybody–of selling average products to average people in an average experience–was becoming increasingly untenable. While it’s easy to credit the “Amazon effect,” or the overall rise of e-commerce, that’s only part of the story. The fact is many factors conspired to squeeze the middle, while, for the most part, the two ends of the spectrum continue to thrive.

For years now brands that execute well on price, dominant assortments, buying efficiency and convenience are winning. Amazon, Walmart, Best Buy, Home Depot, Costco and virtually all the off-price giants and dollar stores, are driving strong growth and profits. And–I hope you are sitting down for this–despite the silly retail apocalypse narrative, they are all opening stores–in some cases lots of them. Similarly, we find many success stories at the other end of the spectrum. Most established luxury brands are experiencing strong growth, as are higher-end specialty retailers who have a tight customer focus, offer a superior experience and provide a real emotional brand connection. Think Apple, Bonobos, Nordstrom, Sephora, Ulta, Warby Parker and many more. Somehow living in the age of Amazon and digital disruption has not come remotely close to creating an existential crisis for these retailers.

Of course, the story is very different for others in the great, mostly undifferentiated, wasteland of the middle. Most of the retailers that have recently made their way to the retail graveyard or find themselves at the precipice suffer from a decided lack of relevance and remarkability. They have decent prices, but not the best price. They have some service, but nothing to get excited about. Their product assortments and presentations are drowning in a sea of sameness. The overall experience is dull, dull, dull. It’s not surprising that a quick perusal of a store closing tracker features names like Sears, J.C. Penney, Macy’s and Radio Shack; brands that staked out the moderate part of the market long ago and have failed to innovate in any material way. Most of these companies now lack the financial resources, time and organizational DNA to affect the necessary transformations. This will end badly.

While it’s tempting to blame Amazon for the deep troubles faced by mid-priced department stores, the category has been on the decline for more than two decades. Studies also show that the majority of market share lost by these players in recent years has gone to the off-price sector. To be sure, Amazon is putting pressure on most sectors of retail. Further, the rise of digital shopping has created a radical transparency that places the customer firmly in charge. In many respects what was once scarce–reliable product information, lower prices, access to products from across the country (and around the world), rapid delivery–no longer is. No customer wants to be average and today, in most instances, no customer has to be. And, for those brands that have seriously invested in deep customer insight and committed to a “treat different customers differently” strategy, there is no place for unremarkable competitors to hide. Good enough no longer is.

The bifurcation of retail is only going to become more pronounced. The fork in the road is more and more obvious. The collapse of the middle will only get worse.

It turns out it’s really bad time to be boring.

bridges_down_01

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  For information on keynote speaking and workshops please go here.