Fashion · Luxury · Omni-channel · Retail

Should Hudson Bay Buy Neiman Marcus? The Case For And Against.

Tuesday morning the Neiman Marcus Group reported another quarter of disappointing financial results and announced that it was going to “explore strategic alternatives.”

To be sure, some of Neiman’s problems are idiosyncratic, largely owing to a botched systems implementation and a now crushing debt load taken on in a 2013 private equity buyout. Yet the brand’s continuing struggles also underscore how luxury retail has hit the wall and how it now seems increasingly likely that the storied company may need to run into the arms of yet another owner.

Recent reports have suggested that the Hudson’s Bay Company was hot on the trail of Macy’s. Yet to many, the notion that HBC would acquire a badly wounded company several times its size, seemed a bit crazy. But the rationale for HBC–the owner of Saks Fifth Avenue and Gilt–to acquire Neiman’s seems, at least at face value, more strategically sound and (perhaps) more easily financed.

When I worked for Neiman Marcus as the head of strategy and corporate marketing we took a hard look at acquiring Saks. Years later, many of the pros and cons of combining the #1 and #2 luxury department stores remain the same.

The Case For

It seems increasingly obvious that the luxury department store sector is quite mature. While e-commerce is growing (now representing 31% of Neiman’s total revenues), most of that is now merely channel shift. Moreover, there are virtually no new full-line store opportunities for either Saks or Neiman’s, and the jury remains out whether or not US brands can find a meaningful number of store openings outside their home markets. Shifting demographics also do not bode well for long-term sector growth.

Faced with this reality, consolidation makes a lot of sense. If Saks were to merge with Neiman’s there would be considerable cost savings from combining many areas of operations. Rationalization of the supply chain would yield material savings as well. Managing the two brands as a cohesive portfolio would allow for optimization of marketing spending and promotional activity. There might even be some benefits from combining buying power to extract greater margins from vendors. Less tangible, but potentially meaningful, is the ability to cascade best practices from each organization.

The more interesting benefits could come from addressing store overlaps. As the market matures and more sales move online, there will be a growing number of trade areas (and specific mall locations) where Saks and Neiman’s going head-to-head only waters down the profitability of each respective location. Selectively closing stores and redeploying that real estate could drive up the remaining locations’ profitability dramatically, while unlocking the underlying real estate value of certain locations. All of which certainly plays into Richard Baker’s (HBC’s Chairman) strengths.

The Case Against

By far the most challenging element of any buyout of Neiman’s by HBC (or by anyone for that matter) would be the price and the related financing. Neiman’s was sold in 2013 for $6 billion dollars and still carries about $5 billion in debt. Since the buyout the company’s EBITDA has gone south, with no prospect for an imminent major turnaround. Given the maturity of the sector and the company’s recent weak operating performance, it’s hard to see why anyone would pay the sort of multiple that would make the current equity and/or debt owners whole.

Unless the real estate value can be unlocked in a transformative way, the only rationale for a merger hinges on the ability to generate operational efficiencies and optimize trade area by trade area market performance. With regard to the former, this isn’t trivial. The Saks and Neiman’s cultures are very different. To say one is very New York and the other is very Texas merely hints at the challenges. It’s easy to sketch out the synergies on paper. Making them actually happen is another thing entirely.

With regard to the latter, the fact is that Saks and Neiman’s are very similar concepts (though Neiman’s historically has been operated far better). When I was at Neiman’s we struggled with how we would operate two virtually identical brands often operating in the same mall–or in places like San Francisco, Beverly Hills, Boston and Chicago–just down the street. Even if we could get out of a lease (or sell the store), would closing a shared location actually be accretive to earnings? If we continued to go head-to-head could we shift the positioning of each brand enough to actually grow market share and profits. Ultimately, other issues trumped this particular concern, but this issue isn’t trivial either and the degree to which it is important mostly comes back to the ultimate price to get a deal done.

Without access to proprietary data it’s impossible to completely assess the likelihood of an HBC/Neiman’s deal. But it seems increasingly likely that something dramatic needs to happen with Neiman’s capital structure and it’s difficult to imagine how another leveraged buyout gets done with private equity sponsors. And it’s hard to see another strategic buyer that makes much sense. More and more, HBC looks like the only game in town.

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts here.

Being Remarkable · Luxury · Retail

Luxury retail hits the wall

For a long time, the conventional wisdom has been that the luxury market was largely impervious to the ups and down of the economy. Yet recent results suggest otherwise and even with an improving macro-economic picture and booming stock market, most U.S.-based luxury retail brands continue to struggle.

A little over a week ago, reports surfaced that Neiman Marcus was looking to restructure its debt after a series of disappointing quarters. While Neiman Marcus faces unique challenges owing to high leverage from its 2013 buyout and a botched systems implementation, they are also being hit by a general malaise affecting the sector. HBC’s Saks Fifth Avenue division revenues have stalled during the past year. Nordstrom, which was once a shining star in the retail pantheon, has seen five straight quarters of declines in its full-line stores. Tiffany and Kors are among other brands facing similar declines. So what’s going on here?

The most common explanations for faltering performance have been the strong dollar’s impact on foreign tourism and a weak oil market. To be sure, these factors have not been helpful. But the problems in the luxury market go deeper, particularly among the department store players. Even an improvement in foreign tourism or the oil market are unlikely to return the sector to its former glory. Here’s why:

  • Little new customer growth. Other than through e-commerce, luxury retailers have had a tough time with customer acquisition for many years. With e-commerce maturing–and most recent reported gains merely channel shift–unfavorable demographics (see below) and very few new store openings, luxury brands are struggling to replace the customers they are losing.
  • Little or no transaction growth. While not widely appreciated, most of the comparable store growth in luxury retail has come through prices increases, not growth in transactions. To change this dynamic companies need to appeal to a wider range of customers and that’s proven difficult to execute in an intensely competitive environment. Brands must be also be careful not to dilute their brand relevance and differentiation in an attempt to cast a wider net.
  • Unfavorable demographics. Affluent baby boomers have propped up the sector for more than a decade. But as customers get older they tend to spend less overall, and quite a bit less on luxury in particular. Baby boomers are slowly but surely aging out of the segment. Gen X is a smaller cohort and there is little evidence they will spend as much as the boomers. Over the longer term, millennials will need to make up for the boomers who, to put it bluntly, will be dying off. Most studies suggest millennials will be more price-sensitive and less status conscious then then the cohorts ahead of them. This is a major long-term headwind.
  • Growing competition. Strict control over distribution largely insulates the luxury market from intense price competition and having to go head-to-head with Amazon. Nevertheless, full-price luxury is increasingly being cannibalized by retailers’ own growing off-price divisions. Luxury brand manufacturers are also aggressively investing in their own direct-to-consumer efforts by improving their e-commerce operations and continuing to open their own stores. Luxury websites like Net-a-Porter are gaining share of a no longer expanding pie.
  • Shifts in spending. Affluent consumers continue to value experiences and services over things–and are allocating their spending accordingly. Perhaps this multi-year trend will start to reverse itself. Perhaps.
  • The omni-channel migration dilemma. Luxury retailers are spending mightily on all things omni-channel, as they must to remain competitive. But it’s incredibly expensive to create a more integrated customer experience. The better a retailer becomes at this, the more business shifts from physical stores to digital. Most often this is not accretive to earnings as brick & mortar economics get deleveraged and online shopping is plagued by high returns and expensive logistics.
  • Looming over-capacity. While the luxury sector does not face the pressure to close stores that the broader market does, stagnant sales and a continued shift to digital channels will start to put more and more pressure on full-line store economics. Moreover, there is growing evidence that the high-end off-price sector is approaching saturation. The rationale for a Saks and Neiman merger may start to make more sense and some pruning of locations seems inevitable.

Notwithstanding the capital structure issues Neiman Marcus must deal with, the luxury market does not face nearly the same immediate challenges that many parts of retail must address. Nevertheless, there is mounting evidence that the sector’s struggles go beyond foreign currency woes and the vagaries of the oil market.

Profound change is coming to luxury as well and most of the headwinds simply aren’t going away.

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts here.

Luxury · Retail

Kors is the latest retail highflier to get its wings clipped

Add once soaring–and seemingly invincible–Michael Kors to the list of retail brands to disappoint the market.

Last week Kors, the “accessible luxury” fashion brand that has grown from a niche player to a multi-billion dollar global juggernaut in under a decade, reported earnings that actually slightly beat expectations. Yet a miss on sales and lowered guidance sent the stock cratering.

At first blush, the overall sales weakness should not have surprised anyone. Kors has pulled back significantly on its wholesale distribution while simultaneously reducing promotional activity. An increase in that sector would have taken a miracle. But what was shocking was a rather precipitous 6.4% drop in comparable stores sales and a nearly 23% decline in licensing revenue.

It’s tempting to see the problems at Kors as brand specific, self inflicted and temporary as the brand realigns its pricing and distribution strategy. But I believe they underscore several broader and more vexing industry issues.

For several quarters now we’ve witnessed a panoply of once mighty high-end brands falter. The luxury department store industry’s big stall is now well into its second year. Saks has reported several quarters of disappointing comps. Neiman Marcus, saddled with high debt and weakening sales, had its debt rating downgraded last week. Nordstrom’s industry leading full-line store performance has become tepid at best. And all of this comes amidst a surging stock market and improving consumer confidence.

To be sure, the strong dollar and weak oil market has a material dampening effect. But even if that were to reverse–which seems rather unlikely anytime soon–the industry is still plagued by increasingly unfavorable demographics, lack of innovation, over capacity and growing consumer willingness to “trade down” to less expensive substitutes. Until these companies find ways to drive traffic increases, attract meaningful numbers of new customers and drive revenues through transaction growth instead of merely raising prices, we can expect a continued string of disappointments from most, if not all, of these brands.

And it just might take a major shakeout to restore the industry to its glory days.

A version of this post originally appeared @Forbes where I recently become a contributor. You can check out my latest work here.

Growth · Luxury · Omni-channel · Retail

The bullet’s already been fired 

I’m fascinated by our capacity to get stuck, the many ways we craft a narrative in a vain attempt to avoid change, the stories we buy into as we hope to keep above the fray. Far too often, the power of denial seems endemic to individuals and organizations alike.

Go back to the 80’s and 90’s and ponder how a slew of successful retailers mostly did nothing while Walmart, Home Depot, Best Buy–and a host of innovative discount mass merchandisers and category killers–moved across the country opening new stores and evolving their concepts to completely redefine industry segments. Somehow it took many years for the old regime to realize what was going on and how much market share was being shed. For many, any acceptance and action came far too late (RIP, Caldor, Montgomery Ward, et al).

Witness how digital delivery of books, music and other forms of entertainment came into prominence while Blockbuster, Borders and Barnes & Noble spent years mostly doing nothing of any consequence. Two of them are now gone and one is holding on for dear life.

Starbucks revolution of the coffee business hardly occurred overnight. But if you were the brand manager of Folger’s or Maxwell House you apparently were caught unawares.

Consider how consumer behavior has been shifting strongly toward online shopping and the utilization of shopping data through digital channels for well over a decade. Yet many companies are seemingly just now waking up to this reality. And by the way, Amazon didn’t just spring out of nowhere. They will celebrate their 22nd anniversary this summer.

And lastly, examine how the elite players of the luxury industry have largely resisted embracing e-commerce–and most things digital–believing that somehow they were immune to the inexorable forces of consumer desires and preferences. Apparently they failed to notice, as just one example, Neiman Marcus’ rise to having 30% of their sales come from online and more than 60% of physical store sales now being influenced by digital channels.

More often than we care to admit, the bullet’s been fired, it just hasn’t hit us yet.

The good news is that while the pace of change is increasing in retail, we have a lot more time to react than we do in a gunfight.

The bad news is that the impact can be just as deadly if we are not prepared.

 

 

Amplify · Being Remarkable · Customer Growth Strategy · Holiday Sales · Luxury · Omni-channel · Retail

My top ten posts of 2015

As has become a tradition, I present my most popular blog posts from this year.

  1.  Bleak Friday
  2.  Learning to surf
  3.  I see dead marketers
  4.  Omni-channel myths, distortions and, yeah, that’s just silly
  5.  What if omni-channel is too expensive?
  6.  An end to omni-channel?
  7.  It’s later than you think
  8.  Luxury retail’s big stall
  9.  Sears: The world’s slowest liquidation sale (redux)
  10.  The fault in our stores

And here are a few more that didn’t quite make the cut, but that I’m rather proud of….

  1. Retail’s new front door
  2. No new stores ever!
  3. A dim signal amidst the noise
  4. Everywhere and nowhere
  5. I fought the math and the math won

As I wrap up my sixth year writing this blog I am so grateful for your attention, support and feedback.

Best wishes for a safe, happy and prosperous New Year!

Luxury · Uncategorized

Luxury retail’s big stall

Neiman Marcus and Saks both just reported disappointing sales and earnings. And both cast most of the blame on the strong dollar’s effect on their tourist business. There was also some whining about the unseasonably warm weather, low oil prices and volatile capital markets.

To be sure, these factors have not been helpful. But the problems in the luxury market go deeper, particularly among the department store players. First some quick context.

The widely held notion among analysts that luxury brands are immune from the vicissitudes of the economy reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of their actual customer base. Yes, a significant percentage of the business comes from the very wealthy, who are not very price sensitive and not affected much by the sturm und drang of the economy. But for all but the most rarified brands, most luxury retail spending comes from what I call the “solidly affluent” (others call them HENRY’s–High Earners Not Yet Rich). These customers have much more volatile spending and much greater price sensitivity (I know this well from 4 years at Neiman Marcus diving into the data and conducting scores of studies). When the economy wanes they pull back. When prices get too high they shop less frequently or trade down to lower priced brands.

So with that as a backdrop–and going beyond the near-term headwinds– here are the key reasons I see a tough longer-term outlook for luxury retail–at least in North America:

  • Little new customer growth. Other than through e-commerce, luxury retail has had a tough time with customer acquisition for more than a decade. With e-commerce maturing, unfavorable demographics (see below) and few, if any, new store openings, luxury department stores, in particular, will struggle to replace the customers they lose.
  • Little or no transaction growth. While not widely appreciated, most of the comparable store growth in luxury retail for quite some time has come through prices increases, not growth in transactions. There is nothing to suggest this trend will change.
  • Unfavorable demographics. Affluent Baby Boomers have propped up the sector for the past decade or so. But as customers get older they spend less in general and quite a bit less on luxury products. The Baby Boomers are slowly but surely “aging out” of the sector. Gen X is a smaller cohort and there is little evidence they will spend as much on average as the Boomers. Over the longer term, Millennials will need to make up for the Boomers who, to put it bluntly, will be dying off. So far, most studies suggest Millennials will be more price sensitive and less status conscious then then the cohorts ahead of them.
  • Limits to price increases. For about 15 years, average luxury retail prices have grown at more than twice the general rate of inflation. In accessories it’s more like three times. Prices just don’t rise forever without affecting demand.
  • Shifts in spending. The affluent continue to value experiences and services over things–and are allocating their spending accordingly. Maybe this multi-year trend will start to reverse itself. Color me skeptical.
  • The omni-channel migration dilemma. Saks, Neiman’s and others are spending mightily on all things omni-channel and frankly the ROI is often terrible. Now they must do so to remain competitive. But it’s incredibly expensive to create a more integrated customer experience and, for the most part, the better you get at it the more you accelerate a shift to digital away from physical stores. Most often this is not accretive to earnings. For either Neiman Marcus or Saks to get a pay-off they need to grab market share. And the reality is they have more competition on the higher end part of their business from the wholesale brands that continue to open up stores and dramatically improve their e-commerce game. And on the lower end of their business they are playing catch up with Nordstrom.

For me, what I see is a sector that clearly has immediate term headwinds. But, more importantly, I see a sector that has much more profound long-term demographic and psycho-graphic headwinds. A sector that will have increasing difficulty wielding it’s tried and true big hammer of price increases. A sector that can no longer count on e-commerce for much new customer growth A sector that has 2-3 years of significant investment in digital and omni-channel capability building just to remain competitive.

Even if the dollar weakens or oil prices rise or we have colder winters, it’s still not a very pretty picture.