Brand Marketing · Customer Growth Strategy · Luxury

Tiffany seeks to execute the ‘customer trapeze’

Last week the Wall St. Journal featured a story on Tiffany & Co’s “midlife crisis.” The piece highlighted the jewelry brand’s struggle to regain its “cool” and improve recently tepid sales and profits. A few days later they announced the hiring of a new CEO.

Yet Tiffany is hardly alone in dealing with what I have coined the “customer trapeze“, particularly as Millennials become an increasingly important demographic.

The customer trapeze is the idea of hoping to reach a new, highly desirable set of customers while letting go of those with less favorable characteristics. Most often we see it at play when brands face an aging customer base. Knowing full well that their customers will literally die off, companies will seek to update their image and strategy to seem more hip and trendy. This might include becoming more fashion forward, less expensive or attaching themselves to celebrities that appeal to different cohorts. The key to executing the trapeze move is to not let go of one group before being fully ready to take on the new one.

In Tiffany’s case, over the years they have introduced less expensive items and expanded their assortments in an attempt to widen their appeal. Most recently, they’ve taken on Lady Gaga and Elle Fanning as spokespeople and launched a new, more youthful ad campaign. They’ve even taken steps to lessen the predominance of their iconic blue in their brand imagery. The challenge, of course, is that many of these steps to attract new customers run the risk of alienating long-term, often highly valuable, ones.

Tiffany follows in the footsteps of many brands that see the demographic writing on the wall and take bold steps to attract new customers. Readers of a certain age may remember the “This Is Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile”campaign. This is a text book example of a brand that let go of one customer group before it could safely latch onto another one. The once legendary company went too far, too fast and, at the risk of pushing the trapeze analogy too far, suffered mightily from its aggressiveness and decision to work without a net.

There are many examples of brands essentially abandoning one customer group too quickly to chase a new, sexier one. Often this comes through an attempt to “trade up” the customer base by pushing more expensive and fashion forward products to attract more affluent consumers. The most recent disaster of this sort came under Ron Johnson’s failed reboot of JC Penney. While not (yet?) fatal, the company has been struggling to recover for over 4 years.

History reveals that very few established brands are able to successfully execute a dramatic re-configuration of their customer base–at least quickly. Once you get beyond Cadillac and IBM, the list grows short indeed. It’s not hard to understand why. The more a brand is known for one set of things, the harder it is to persuade consumers to believe something fundamentally new and different. To the extent a company starts to dramatically move away from what made it successful with its traditional segment in the hopes of cultivating a new group, it risks alienating its historical core. More often than not, the customers that are being de-emphasized are significant contributors to current cash flow. We saw this with JC Penney and I witnessed it first hand when we tried similar moves at Sears more than a decade ago.

With rare exception, brands simply cannot survive, much less thrive over the long-term without being really good at acquiring profitable new customers to replenish those that leave or naturally decrease their spending. But executing this transition is not so easy. Like any trapeze act, the customer trapeze is all about speed, coordination and timing. Let go at the wrong time, be it too late or too early, and the fall can be disastrous.

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.

Innovation · Leadership

The crushing force of retail insularity

Urban Outfitters is the latest retailer to be called out for the insularity of its board leadership. And rightly so. The lack of diversity, measured on just about every relevant dimension, has been a persistent and intractable issue for many large company boards.

It’s hard to imagine an industry that is more in need of outside, diverse and challenging perspectives than retail. New technology, shifting consumer desires and disruptive business models have been wracking the industry for more than a decade, with the pace of change only seeming to accelerate. We now face profit squeezes, layoffs, store closings and bankruptcies at unprecedented rates.

Yet few of the legacy retail brands being hammered (some to the point of extinction) by these seismic changes have done much, if anything, to bring in Directors with deep knowledge of the changing technology, business model and consumer landscape. I warned about this five years ago, spurred on mostly by noting the appalling lack of relevant expertise on the J.C. Penney board to effectively challenge the reckless “hail Mary” strategy being promulgated by then CEO Ron Johnson. While clearly Penney’s needed to do something bold to get back on track, it should have been obvious how wrong-headed many of the ideas were. A stock that traded around $40 per share when Johnson started now trades at under $6.

The insularity on the part of corporate boards is but one issue plaguing traditional retail. The last two retailers I worked for as a senior executive, as well as many of the consulting clients I have advised, suffer mightily from a culture of insularity that extends beyond board composition. Show me an organization that is losing customer relevance (and resultant market share) and chances are you’ve shown me a company that is inwardly focused on process, budget allocations, cost reduction and intramural warfare between rival internal factions. These brands know appallingly little about the competition and potentially game-changing technology. They lack deep and actionable customer insight. Mostly, they are paralyzed by analysis and unwilling to take the risks that today’s fast-moving retail industry demands.

Extreme insularity within retail organizations is, arguably, the single biggest barrier to a brand making the changes necessary to thrive, must less survive, in what some call the “retail apocalypse.” Providing leadership opportunities (board or otherwise) to folks with diverse backgrounds is, in my mind, a moral imperative. But more than that, it is just smart business. Action must be taken, not just lip service. As Jack Kornfield reminds us: “The trouble is you think you have time.”

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A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  

Omni-channel · Retail · Store closings

Wall Street’s Misguided (And Dangerous) Fascination With Retail Store Productivity

An unprecedented number of retail store locations are closing this year and more announcements are surely coming–though perhaps not quite as many as I suggested in my April Fool’s post.

Given the lack of innovation on the part of traditional retailers, rampant overbuilding and the disruptive nature of e-commerce, this ongoing and massive consolidation of retail space was both inevitable and overdue. Yet much of the way the investor community sees the need for even more aggressive store closings is wrong and, one could argue, pretty dangerous.

One of the more ridiculous ways Wall Street firms have tried to determine the “right” number of store closings is to calculate how many locations would need to be shuttered to return various chains to their 2006 store productivity levels. A somewhat more responsible, though still alarming, analysis comes from Cowen, which focused more on the need to more closely align retail selling space supply and demand.

The most obvious problem with this type of analysis is its focus on ratios. The fact is that many stores with below average productivity are still quite profitable, particularly department stores, given their low rent factors. So while closing a lot of locations may yield a temporary productivity boost it often has a direct and immediate negative impact on earnings, which is a far better indicator of a retailer’s health.

The bigger issue is an underlying misunderstanding of the role of brick & mortar stores in retail’s new world order. Just as “same-store” sales is an increasingly irrelevant metric, so are store productivity numbers. Yes, more stores need to close. Yes, many of the stores that remain need a major rethink with regard to their size and fundamental operations. But what many still fail to grasp is how a retailer’s store footprint drives a brand’s overall health and the success of its e-commerce operations.

A given store’s productivity can be below average and decline yet still contribute to a retailer’s overall success, particularly online. Stores serve as an important–and often low cost–channel to acquire new customers. Stores serve as showrooms that drive customers online. Stores serve as fulfillment points for e-commerce operations. Stores are billboards for a retail brand. Without a compelling store footprint, a brand’s relevance will likely decline and its e-commerce business almost certainly will falter. Stated simply, store productivity numbers, taken in isolation, no longer get at the heart of a brand’s overall performance in an omnichannel world.

While there surely is merit in closing stores that drain cash and management attention, store closings can often make a bad situation worse. Ironically–as Kevin Hillstrom from MineThatData does a great job of illustrating–closings stores to respond to e-commerce growth can actually have the opposite effect. In fact, from my experience, massive store closings often initiate (or at least signal) a coming downward spiral.

Store closings are hardly the panacea that Wall Street seems to believe. And the notion that a brand can shrink its way to prosperity is typically horribly misguided. Macy’s, J.C. Penney and a host of others need to close more stores. And Sears and Kmart just need to go away. But, as I’ve said many times before, show me a retailer that is closing a lot of stores and you’ve likely shown me a retailer that doesn’t have too many stores, but a retail brand that is no longer relevant enough for the stores it has.

The danger of closing too many stores is increasingly real. The danger that struggling retailers will continue to appease Wall Street’s thirst for taking an ax to store counts instead of working on the underlying fault in their stores seems, sadly, clear and present.

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.  

Winning on Experience

Every Single Retail Store in the US To Close Permanently By Month’s End

In a surprise move that underscores the sweeping changes faced by the retail industry, the National Retail Federation, speaking on behalf of all of its members, announced today that every brick & mortar location of every retailer in the United States would close forever within the next few weeks. For nearly a decade “traditional” retailers have been struggling with profitability as sales shifted online and more consumers started to notice that many retailers appeared to have given up years earlier. Yet the move to close down every single store in America still came as a shock to most industry observers.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a CEO of one major retail brand remarked “I would have thought that the fact that 90% of all shopping is still done in physical locations would have been enough to warrant keeping at least a few stores around. I guess I was wrong.” Former Texas Governor Rick Perry, who was recently named Sears’ 13th CEO in as many months, seemed surprised as well. “Wait, most shopping is still done in stores? I guess maybe we should have worked on making our stores better rather than thinking that closing them down would somehow make things better? Oops.”

Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon, the brand that has benefitted the most from consumers’ growing love of e-commerce, was approached for comment after delivering his keynote at the annual World Hyperbole Conference in Geneva, but would not speak to reporters. He was, however seen high-fiving Elon Musk off stage and doing what some described as a “clumsy Irish jig” upon learning the news.

Other industry veterans were more circumspect. Ryan Gozzi, a prominent Wall Street analyst who has been pushing many retail brands to shutter locations to improve profitability, commented “honestly I think this just goes too far. I always envisioned retailers would cut and cut until they had just a handful of stores that did like $15,000 per square foot, you know like Warby Parker, Bonobos and Birchbox.” When asked what he thought of today’s announcement Ron Johnson, who oversaw a failed attempt to re-invent JC Penney, looked earnestly into the interviewer’s eyes and exclaimed “Apple. Apple. Target. Apple. Target. Apple. Apple,” then added “golly that’s big news. I was only able to decrease Penney’s sales by about 40%. So signing up for destroying 100% of sales is truly transformative. Gosh I’m impressed.”

The complete shut down of all stores comes after many retailers had aggressively explored new strategies to revive their fortunes. According to multiple sources, newly appointed Macy’s CEO Jeff Gennette recently presented his Board with a bold plan to turn the storied retailer around. The strategy, developed with a team of 2nd year Wharton MBA students, was designed to transform the Macy’s culture and incorporate many of the components that have allowed so-called “digitally native” brands to grab market share away from traditional player while transferring billions of dollars from venture capitalists to consumers without anyone apparently noticing or caring.

The new plan reportedly called for the company to relocate its headquarters to a loft-building in the Pearl District of Portland where employees would receive complimentary Stumptown Coffee and Voodoo Donuts, in addition to an enhanced benefits package. Reports that corporate staff would be required to bring their dogs to work could not be independently confirmed. According to multiple sources, sales associates were to be re-named “customer service sensei’s” and the company would guarantee 15 minute delivery of any product anywhere in the continental United States for free. Initial plans also called for consumers to receive 1,500 Plenti points with every order over $50 but were dropped when research revealed that no one knew what Plenti points were.

According to insiders the plan hinged on four key elements:

  • Liberal use of the words “disruptive” and “transformative” in conversation, written communication and speeches at analyst meetings and conferences.
  • Getting on the cover of Fast Company.
  • A willingness to lose a cumulative $27 billion over the next 10 years.
  • A miracle happening in year 11.

The Board was reportedly initially intrigued, but the strategy lost support when one member pointed out that the plan was mostly just a description of Amazon’s strategy and that nothing was being done to improve the products Macy’s sold or the actual shopping experience. Ultimately a growing malaise crept over the Board despite plans to hold their Board dinner that evening at Masa. According to one long time Macy’s Director “while we were excited to dine together that night at arguably the best sushi restaurant outside of Japan, we couldn’t get past the realization that when it came to our business we had nothing. Absolutely nothing.”

While today’s announcement would seem to doom many once leading brands to the retail graveyard, some believe Walmart might come out ahead. The Bentonville, Arkansas based company recently began aggressively acquiring online-only brands in a bid to become “more customer relevant and digitally savvy.” Sean Spicer, Walmart’s newly appointed VP of Cash Incineration Initiatives, told the Wall Street Journal that the shuttering of all physical stores only validated what Walmart has been saying all along and that anyone who says otherwise is either stupid or lying. Challenged on that remark Spicer added: “Hold on, hold on, hold on. We’ve always maintained that the future of retail is selling cheap stuff that Americans need, shipping it to their house, losing money on every order and making it up on volume. If you can’t see that you haven’t been paying attention.” He then told reporters to direct any further questions to the Justice Department.

The economic impact of closings tens of thousands of stores and putting hundreds of thousands of people out of work remains unclear, but many were concerned it could lead to a recession. It also cast serious doubt on President Trump’s claim that ‘we would be winning so much we would get tired of winning.” Prior to today’s news a recent Gallup survey confirmed that most Americans weren’t remotely tired of winning.

Many commercial real estate investors also expressed concern that billions of square feet of vacant retail space coming on the market all at once would have a depressive effect on rents. Despite this widely shared belief, General Michael Flynn, recently named President of the Association for Commercial Real Estate Over-Capacity Denial” noted that the industry had gone through multiple down cycles over the years and that any excess supply would quickly be absorbed. “For every Home Depot or Target that closes there are plenty of Soul Cycles and expensive juice bars with that one employee awkwardly standing there to take their place” Flynn said.

 

For real stuff please follow me on Twitter and @Forbes

 

 

 

 

 

 

Being Remarkable · Customer Growth Strategy

JC Penney: The good, the bad and the ugly.

J.C. Penney recently announced its fourth quarter earnings as well as plans to shutter as many as 140 stores. To say the least, the announcement was a decidedly mixed bag.

On the good–or at least improving–side, earnings were a bit better than anticipated. Moreover, Penney’s comparable stores sales fell “only” 0.7%, materially better than their direct competitors, indicating some growth in relative market share. The company also continues to experience double-digit e-commerce growth with some 75% of online orders “touching” a physical store. While the picture is incomplete, this at least suggests that they are gaining much needed traction on their omnichannel initiatives. The retailer will continue to roll-out appliances, positioning them well for growth as Sears implodes and HHGregg appears headed for bankruptcy. And Penney’s should gain share in other key categories as Sears, Macy’s and others close stores and continue to struggle.

Given the huge revenue drop during the Ron Johnson era, the bad news continues to be that despite all the merchandising and operating improvements during the past three years, regaining material market share is proving nearly impossible. Moreover, the small amount of share that has been clawed back has come at high rates of couponing and promotional activity. Penney’s can never become a profitable retailer merely by closing a bunch of stores and maintaining an unprofitable level of discounting. Until Penney’s proves it can drive positive same store sales and a sustainable margin rate the turnaround remains teetering on the brink of life support.

The ugly centers on the increasingly dire picture these announcements paint for “traditional” department stores. Everything we have seen of late from the moderate department store players indicates that the sector’s decades long decline is not only accelerating but is reaching the tipping point where consolidation, store rationalization and fundamental business model restructuring must occur at a much faster and more dramatic pace. There is no scenario in which the available market these retailers compete for does not continue to shrink, thereby eviscerating the underlying economics of hundreds of physical locations. Pruning costs, rolling-out new merchandising strategies, offering “buy-on-line, pick-up-in-store”–and all the other turn-out plans outlined in the press releases–are all likely worthwhile. But they are not remotely close to sufficient.

With all the store closings already in the works–and more certain to follow–it will take some time for the dust to settle. The potential for a major acquisition or two may further cloud the picture this year. The only thing we know for sure is that the “profit pool” for the sector continues to contract and it’s very likely that one or more players won’t be around by this time next year. Until one or more of the remaining brands can demonstrate both improving margins and sustained comparable stores sales the sector starts to look one where no one can earn a decent return.

And maybe no one gets out of here alive.

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts here.

Being Remarkable · Customer Growth Strategy

Relevance-light models are now retail’s big problem

So-called “asset-light” business models, where a company has relatively few capital assets compared to the overall size of its operations, have drawn increasing attention (and investor dollars) in recent years. Think Airbnb, Uber, Snap and many other essentially digital-only brands. The concept isn’t new. Brand licensing and many hotel management and franchise-based businesses have employed this formula for years.

In fact, the initial appeal of e-commerce was centered on the notion that a profitable business could be built without expensive physical stores loaded up with gobs of inventory. Then people started to learn that even with relatively little capital tied up in brick & mortar, both online-only brands and the e-commerce divisions of omni-channel retailers still have a hard time making money.

Recently, more and more traditional retailers have been drinking the asset-light Kool-Aid. Sears Holdings CEO Eddie Lampert has been jettisoning real estate and investing heavily in e-commerce while largely ignoring physical stores. Macy’s, HBC and other department and specialty stores have been closing and/or spinning off real estate assets galore. JCPenney is among a number of retailers that are bringing in outside entities to run parts of their business, effectively reducing the risk of a heavy commitment to physical space and inventory.

Clearly some of these moves may make sense as either savvy financial engineering strategies or targeted product/service offerings. Well, not for Sears, but perhaps for others.

Yet as we seek to understand what’s behind the headline grabbing announcements–with many more certain to come–we should grasp one key concept. The fundamental problem at Sears, Penney’s, Macy’s, Kohl’s, Dillard’s and a host of other long suffering retail brands is not that they have too many assets. The driving issue is that they have too little relevance for the assets they possess. In fact, we need look no further than last week’s strong earnings announcements from Home Depot and Walmart to see that retail companies can have enormous physical assets and still remain relevant.

Unfortunately, more times than not, focusing attention on driving down assets (the denominator of a success equation) instead of improving customer relevance (the numerator) only helps the investor math for a short time. This is not to say that store closings are not needed. But the evidence is clear that plenty of asset-heavy retailers have figured out how to make money without embracing the store closing panacea.

Leaders and Boards of struggling retailers may think they are pursuing a smart asset-light strategy. My fear is that most of them are only deepening their commitment to a relevance-light model. And that’s likely to end badly.

 

A version of this post appeared @Forbes where I have recently become a retail contributor. To see more click here.

Being Remarkable · Customer-centric · Digital · Frictionless commerce · Omni-channel · Winning on Experience

Stop blaming Amazon for department store woes

Given Amazon’s staggering growth and willingness to lose money to grab market share it’s easy to blame them for everything that is ailing “traditional” retail overall–and the  department store sector in particular.

In fact, with announcements last week from Macy’s to Kohl’s and Sears to JC Penney that could only charitably be called “disappointing” many folks that get paid to understand this stuff reflexively jumped on the “it’s all Amazon’s fault” bandwagon. Too bad they are mostly wrong.

The fact is the department store sector has been losing consumer relevance and share for a long, long time–and certainly well before Amazon had even a detectable amount of competing product in core department store categories.

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The fact is it’s just as logical to blame off-price and warehouse club retailer growth–which is almost entirely done in physical locations, by the way–for department stores’ problems.

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The fact is that, despite other challenges along the way, Nordstrom, Saks and Neiman Marcus have maintained share by transitioning a huge amount of their brick & mortar business to their online channels and have closed only a handful of stores in the last few years. Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus now both derive some 25% of their total sales from e-commerce.

Don’t get me wrong, I’m not saying that Amazon isn’t stealing business from the major department store players. Clearly they are. And as Amazon continues to grow its apparel business they will grab more and more share.

But the underlying reason for department stores decades long struggle is the sector’s consistent inability to transform their customer experience, product assortments, marketing strategies and real estate to meet consumers’ evolving needs.

More recently, those brands that have been slow to embrace digital first retail are scrambling to play catch up. Those that still haven’t broken down the silos that create barriers to a frictionless shopping experience will continue to hemorrhage customers and cash.

Most importantly those that think they can out Amazon Amazon are engaged in a race to the bottom. And as Seth reminds us, the problem with a race to the bottom is that you might win.

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Being Remarkable · Customer Growth Strategy · Innovation

No new stores ever!

What if your company could never open another store? I’m not talking about relocations. I mean a truly new unit that adds top-line growth for your brand.

That’s pretty much the case in the US department store sector. Macy’s, JC Penney, Dillard’s and Sears (obviously) are closing far more full-line stores than they will open.

The generally more resilient luxury sector isn’t exactly booming. Nordstrom will open only 3 new stores in the US over the next 3 years. Neiman Marcus will open 2 full-line stores over 4 years. Saks is probably done finding viable new locations. It’s hard to imagine how this current outlook will get better.

Major sectors like office supplies and specialty teen are going through wrenching consolidations and hemorrhaging sites. And for every Dollar General, Charming Charlies and Dick’s Sporting Goods that have decent opportunities for regional expansion and market back-fill, there are far more that have overshot the runway.

“But Steve”, you say, “we’re seeing great growth in our online business. That’s our future.” That may be true, but how much of that is actually incremental growth? For most “omni-channel” retailers–particularly those that aren’t playing catch up in basic capabilities (I’m looking at you JC Penney)–more and more of what gets reported as digital sales is merely channel shift.

In fact, you don’t have to be Einstein to understand what’s going on when brands report strong e-commerce growth, yet overall sales growth is barely positive. For a great discussion of this check out Kevin’s blog post on hiding the numbers.

The fact is we have too many stores and most consumers have too much stuff.

The fact is the retailers that operate the most stores and sell the most stuff are rapidly reaching the point where, for all practical purposes, they will never open a new store.

The fact is very few large retailers are experiencing much incremental growth from e-commerce and, either way, that growth is small relative to their base and beginning to slow substantially.

The fact is, going forward, most brands will only grow the top-line above the rate of inflation by developing strategies that steal market share. And the me-too tactics and one-size-fits all customer strategies that currently account for the bulk of most brands time and money simply won’t cut it.

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Brand Marketing · Customer Growth Strategy · Customer Insight · Marketing

All about that base?

When politicians start a campaign one of the first questions they ask is how they can appeal to the base. Mainstream candidates lock into the usual suspects for rally turnout and fund-raising. The reformers struggle for voter attention and ways to tap into the key PAC’s and the Koch’s and Soros’ of the world.

Traditional brand marketers usually start here as well. We focus on more and better ways of activating existing consumers where the investment to acquire them is sunk and where we already know that they like us and buy often. It seems like a perfectly logical place to concentrate our efforts.

Except where those cohorts are aging out of maintaining their spending. Think Sears.

Except where their needs have shifted and we are no longer their brand or store of choice. Think Barnes & Noble.

Except where a new disruptive model has come along and is doing things we can’t while gobbling up our core customers’ share of wallet. Think Warby Parker and LensCrafters.

Except where we are not replenishing defectors or downward migrators with enough new profitable customers. Think JC Penney.

Good customer analysis always starts with the base. Better customer analysis is focused on a deep understanding of the leverage and limitations inherent in our core segments and yields the insight required to know where to go next and how urgent and powerful any shifts need to be.

It’s all about that base, until it isn’t.

 

 

Being Remarkable · Growth · Innovation · Retail

The problem with saying “no”

During the past 25 years Sears had at least three opportunities to transform itself by entering the home improvement warehouse business (I worked on two of them). This was probably the only way Sears was going to ultimately survive and unlock the value of its franchise Kenmore and Craftsman brands. Each time the answer was “no.”

When I headed up strategy at the Neiman Marcus Group (2004-08), we evaluated building a leadership position in omni-channel by consolidating our disparate inventory systems, we recommended moving from a channel centric marketing organization to a customer and brand focused one, we proposed aggressively expanding our off-price format and, having understood the share lost to competitors like Nordstrom, we analyzed improvements to our merchandising and service models to become a bit more accessible. Ultimately we said “no” to moving ahead on all of these. Years later, these strategies were ultimately resurrected. But the opportunity to establish and extend a leadership position may have been lost.

Obviously there are plenty of times when either the smart or moral thing to do is to say ‘no.” Obviously it’s easy to look back and say “I told you so.”

Yet systemically, most organizations are set up to reward the status quo (often cost containment and driving incremental improvement) and punish the well intended experiment. So it’s easy to say “yes” to the historically tried and true and “no” to just about everything else.

Of course we don’t have to look very hard to come up with brands that have been struggling for many, many years (Sears, JC Penney, Radio Shack) or have completely imploded (Borders, Blockbuster, etc.). All of these said “no’ to any number of potentially game-changing strategies along the way. Care to hazard a guess at how many long-term Board Members of these perennial laggards and outright losers got pushed out for saying grace over a series of crippling “no’s”? How many CEO’s had their compensation whacked for never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity?

In a world where change is coming at us faster and faster, we need to be challenged just as much on what we are saying ‘no” to as we are on what gets a “yes.”

And If you think there is always time to fix the wrong “no” decision, you might want to think again.