Being Remarkable · Reinventing Retail · Store closings

The Retail Apocalypse And The Urgent Quest For Remarkable

Some love the “retail apocalypse” narrative. It’s great clickbait, makes for captivating keynote speeches and gives consultants a hook to peddle complicated strategic frameworks. Alas, it’s mostly nonsense. Physical retail is definitely different, but it’s far from dead. The fact is plenty of new stores are opening, many traditional retailers and — I hope you are sitting down — even quite a few malls are doing great. Brick-and-mortar retail sales are likely to be up this year, just as they were last year.

Some retailers love hearing this alternative narrative because they think it means they will be okay, that they don’t have to change, that there is some storm they just have to ride out. Unfortunately, that is not only nonsense, it is dangerous nonsense. While physical retail is not dead, virtually every aspect of retail is changing dramatically, as this excellent pieceby Doug Stephens points out. While I believe Doug overstates a few things, his underlying premise is on the money. Almost everything has to change and the key thing to understand is that the future of retail will not be evenly distributed. Stated simply: yes, some brands will do well. But many others will struggle mightily, others will be eviscerated and quite a few are dead already, they just don’t know it.

Physical retail is not going away but unremarkable retail is getting hammered. The brands that relied on good enough are learning the hard way that good enough no longer is. The mediocre brands that were protected by scarcity of information, distribution and access are getting blown apart as the customer can now get the same product anytime, anywhere, anyway — and often for less money. The brands that tried to stake out a place in the vast wasteland between cheap and special are losing as retail becomes more bifurcated and it’s increasingly clear that it’s death in the middle.

By now, a few things should be abundantly clear:

Just because physical retail isn’t dead doesn’t mean you don’t have to change.

On average, more than 80% of retail will still be done in physical stores in 2025. Unfortunately, you can’t pay your bills with averages and your mileage will vary. The way the migration of sales away from physical stores to online will affect your competitive situation and marginal economics can have devastating consequences. Even small shifts can require the need for radical reinvention.

Stop blaming Amazon.

hile there is no question of Amazon’s dramatic and growing impact upon the retail ecosystem, most of the retail industry’s problems today have nothing to do with Amazon. Overbuilding, excessive discounting, boring product, unremarkable experiences and a fundamental lack of innovation are the main reasons that most retailers are struggling today.

It’s not just about e-commerce. 

The most disruptive force in retail is not e-commerce but the fact that most customer journeys start in a digital channel. In fact, digitally-influenced brick-and-mortar sales dwarf online sales.

You can’t out-Amazon Amazon. 

Pop quiz: Are you Walmart or Target? No? Okay, then stop trying to out-price, out-assort and out-convenience Amazon. To paraphrase Seth Godin: the problem with a race to the bottom is you might win.

Choose remarkable. 

Unless you are on the short list of brands that can be just about everything to everybody (and actually make money) your task is to get hyperfocused on a set of consumers for whom you can be intensely relevant and remarkable at scale. That likely means being far more experiential and blending the best of online and offline in a compelling and harmonized way.

Be prepared to blow stuff up. 

Remarkable is easier said than done. And most retailers suffer from bringing a knife to a gun fight when it comes to innovation. Much of what got us any level of success in the past isn’t going to work in the age of digital disruption. New thinking, new processes, new technology, new metrics and new people are table-stakes on the path to retail reinvention.

Hurry.

As the Chinese proverbs says, “the best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second best time is now.” Chances are you’re already behind and it’s far later than you think. The only choice then is to get started. Now. And go fast. Fail fast. Rinse and repeat.

The big problem is we think we have time.

purple cow

A version of this story appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here

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Retail · Store closings · The Amazon Effect

Department store quarterly performance: Better isn’t the same as good

Last week we had five major department stores report their quarterly earnings: Macy’sKohl’sNordstromDillard’s and JCPenney. It was a decidedly mixed bag relative to both expectations and absolute performance. Yet many observers seemed encouraged by the overall improvement in sales trend. Yet the overall sector is still losing market share, just not at quite as fast a rate. Which begs the question, is less bad somehow good?

It’s clear that one must pull out of a dive before an ascent can begin. It’s also obvious that reducing the rate of descent is no guarantee of a resurrection. Better is simply not the same as good. So to understand whether recent results provide a dose of optimism or are merely noise, it’s worth looking more closely at a few key considerations.

More rationalization must occur. The sector has been in decline for two decades–and not because of Amazon or e-commerce. The main reason is that department stores failed to innovate. They focused on expense reduction and excessive promotions, instead of being more remarkable and relevant. That won’t be fixed easily or quickly. So, in the meantime, there is simply too much supply chasing contracting consumer demand. Sector profitability isn’t going to improve much until Sears goes away and additional location pruning on the part of remaining players occurs.

Yet physical retail is not going away. Brick & mortar retail is becoming very different, but it’s far from dead. There is no fundamental reason why any given department store cannot not have a viable operation with hundreds of physical locations, particularly when we realize that some 80% of all products in core department store categories are purchased offline.

You can’t shrink to prosperity. Wall Street seems to think that store closings are a panacea. They’re wrong. It’s one thing to right-size both store counts and individual store sizes in response to overbuilding and shifting consumer preferences. It’s another thing to make a brand’s value proposition fundamentally more relevant and remarkable. Department stores must spend more time working on giving consumers reasons to shop in the channels they have (note: excessive discounting doesn’t count) and abandon the idea that shuttering scores of locations is a silver bullet.

Same-store sales are an increasingly irrelevant metric. Wall Street needs to let go of its obsession with same-store performance as the be-all-end-all performance indicator. Any decent “omni-channel” retailer should be on its way to–or as is already true with Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus well past–more than 20% of its overall sales coming from e-commerce. So unless a retailer is gobbling up market share most of that business is coming from existing stores. The reality is that shifting consumer preferences are going to make it nearly impossible for many retailers (of any kind) to run positive store comps. That does not mean a brand cannot grow trade area market share and profits. And it doesn’t mean that a given store is not productive even if sales keep trending down. Stores drive online, and vice versa. Smart retailers understand this and focus on customer segment and trade area dynamics, not merely individual store performance in isolation.

It is going to take more than a couple of quarters to fully understand whether the department store sector has stabilized, much less turned the corner. As we look ahead, of the five that reported, Nordstrom is clearly the best positioned, both from the standpoint of having relevant and differentiated formats and possessing physical and digital assets that are the closest to being “right-sized” for the future. And call me crazy, but I sense that JC Penney is actually starting to gain some meaningful traction. Dillard’s is a mess and Macy’s and Kohl’s remain very much works in progress.

Regardless, with tepid consumer demand and over-capacity, no department store brand (and I’d include Neiman Marcus and Saks in the mix as well) does especially well until we see further consolidation. And even when that occurs, if department stores keep swimming in a sea of sameness and engaging in a promotional race to the bottom, they have zero chance of getting back to a sustainable, much less interesting, level of performance. Better is nice. Encouraging even. But it is simply not the same as good.

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.

Being Remarkable · Forbes · Omni-channel · Store closings

Honey, I shrunk the store

While the “retail apocalypse” narrative is nonsense, it’s clear that we are witnessing a major contraction in traditional retail space. Store closings have tripled year over year and more surely loom on the horizon. The “death of the mall” narrative also tilts to the hyperbolic, but in many ways it is the end of the mall as we know it, as dozens close and even larger number are getting re-invented in ways big and small.

While the shrinking of store fleets gets a lot of attention, another dynamic is becoming important. Increasingly, major retailers are down-sizing the average size of their prototypical store. In some cases, this is a solid growth strategy. Traditional format economics often don’t allow for situating new locations in areas with very high rents or other challenging real estate circumstances. Target’s urban strategy is one good example. In other situations, smaller formats allow for a more targeted offering, as with Sephora’s new studio concept.

By far, however, the big driver is the impact of e-commerce. With many retailers seeing online sales growing beyond 10% of their overall revenues–and in cases like Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus north of 25%–brick & mortar productivity is declining. It therefore seems logical that retailers can safely shrink their store size to improve their overall economics.

Yet the notion that shrinking store size is an automatic gateway to better performance is just as misunderstood and fraught with danger as the idea that retailers can achieve prosperity through taking an axe to the size of their physical store fleets. To be sure, there are quite a few categories where physical stores are relatively unimportant to either the consumer’s purchase decision and/or the underlying ability to make a profit. Books, music, games and certain commodity lines of businesses are great examples. But brick & mortar stores are incredibly important to the customer journey for many other categories, whether the actual purchase is ultimately consummated in a physical location or online.

Often the ability to touch & feel the product, talk to a sales person or have immediate gratification are critical. In other cases, lower customer acquisition and supply chain costs make physical stores an essential piece of the overall economic equation. Shrinking the store base or the size of a given store can have material adverse effects on total market share and profit margins. For this reason, retailers are going to need (and Wall St. must understand) a set of new metrics.

The worst case scenario is that a brand makes itself increasingly irrelevant by having neither reasonable market coverage with its physical store count nor a compelling experience in each and every store it operates. Managing for sheer productivity while placing relevance and remarkability on the back burner is all too often the start of a downward spiral. Failing to understand that a compelling store presence helps a retailer’s online business (and vice versa) can lead to reducing both the number of stores and the size of stores beyond a minimally viable level. But enough about Sears.

In the immediate term, we may feel good that by shooting under-performing locations and shrinking store sizes through the pruning of “unproductive” merchandise we are able to drive margin rates higherAlas, increasing averages does nothing if we are losing ground over the long-term with the customers that matter.

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.

 

Consolidation · Luxury · Store closings

The Kors/Jimmy Choo Deal May Usher In A New Era Of Retail Consolidation

Last week’s announcement that Michael Kors would buy luxury shoe and accessories brand Jimmy Choo comes on the heels (heh, heh) of Coach’s $2.4 billion deal to acquire Kate Spade. While this particular move is not in and of itself a catalyst for more merger & acquisition activity, there is a growing sense that various forces are converging to drive an acceleration in retail industry consolidation.

The biggest driver is the harsh reality that organic growth is getting harder and harder to come by. Most sectors of the luxury market have stalled and retailers across a spectrum of formats and price points are being confronted with the need to downsize their physical store footprints amidst retail overcapacity and a fundamental shift in consumer spending behavior. Many companies–and Coach and Kors are good examples of this–have hit a wall in how far their core brands can be stretched and expanded. Strategic acquisitions offer the potential to address different price points and/or reach new demographics that are not easily accessible by their primary banners. In Kors case, it looks like the Jimmy Choo deal will not be their last.

Another driver is the underlying dynamics of operating in today’s ever shifting, fast changing retail world. The power is shifting way from brands toward the consumer, away from retailers toward product brand owners, away from physical toward e-commerce and away from traditional mass market ways of reaching consumers toward all things digital. For many brands, a fundamental reinvention of their model is required and that necessitates new skills, increased scale, more speed and greater agility.

Accordingly, some recent transactions have been motivated by a desire for the acquiring brand to inject new talent and ideas into a moribund culture. Others are driven by a classic “make vs. buy” decisions or spurred by more opportunistic situations where a struggling player runs into the arms of a cash rich suitor. Walmart’s recent activity seems to be a little bit of all the above.

The aborted discussions between HBC and Neiman Marcus might be more illustrative of what the future holds. More and more, I expect to see traditional players come to the realization that their sector must be consolidated and rationalized as top line growth opportunities evaporate and it becomes clear that meaningful earnings growth can only come from taking out capacity, mitigating competitive intensity and better leveraging scale and scope. In some cases these transactions will come together through proactive, forward thinking leadership. Others will be triggered by the opportunity to acquire assets at fire sale prices when a competitor is struggling or files for bankruptcy.

Either way, with the ripple effects of disruption only growing stronger, the pace of activity is likely to quicken considerably. And it just may turn out that store closings are not the only big retail story this year.

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.

 

Digital · e-commerce · Retail · Store closings

Sears must think we’re stupid or gullible. Here’s why.

Having spent my first 12 years in retail as an executive at Sears, I’ve followed the company’s trials and tribulations with more than a passing interest. And considering my last role at the once-storied brand was leading corporate strategy–where my team was mostly focused on trying to fix the mall-based department store format and making the Lands’ End acquisition work–I am far from an impartial or unknowing observer.

Arguably, I’ve taken Sears to task too many times over the years. When I left Sears in 2003 (a year before Sears and K-mart merged), I had already concluded that the once iconic brand was on a slow slide to oblivion. Combining a deteriorating, mediocre chain with a terrible one did not change my view. Over the years Eddie Lampert’s misguided leadership has been a frequent target of criticism on my blog. In 2013, I labeled Sears “The World’s Slowest Liquidation Sale” as it became abundantly clear that after nine years Lampert still had no viable turnaround plan. In 2014, I lampooned the futility of their efforts in an April Fool’s post and went on CNBC arguing that investors would be better served by a swift liquidation rather than perpetuating an increasingly delusional strategy that only served to lower asset values.

So, years later, Sears is still hanging around and Lampert is still peddling his special brand of snake oil. How is this possible?

Let’s answer the easy question first. Sears has endured longer than they deserve to because they had enough assets to unload (real estate, private brands and fungible business units) to cover the massive operating losses they’ve racked up during the past decade. The fact that Sears has very low operating costs (partially because of favorable rents, partially because Lampert has cut overhead to the bone) has extended their life. But, make no mistake, they are very close to the end of the runway.

To answer the other question we must conclude that investors are either stupid or gullible–or at least Lampert is counting on it. Before we get to the most recent nonsense, it’s worth mentioning some of the whoppers we were supposed to believe over the years:

  • That Sears and Kmart would create some magical synergy
  • That Sears’ problems could be fixed by cutting costs rather than investing in the customer experience
  • That it made sense to have merchandise categories compete internally with each other, rather than focus on the customer and external competition
  • That Sears could disinvest in stores and profitably transition much of its business online
  • That selling once enormously valuable private brands like Kenmore, Craftsman and DieHard in off-the-mall formats and Ace Hardware Stores was a sufficient antidote to the massive share loss to Home Depot, Lowe’s and Best Buy.

Today, the company continues to make a big deal about how it is a “member-driven” company, touting its “Shop Your Way” program and “ecosystem” as some sort of important differentiator and value contributor. The facts are that a) it is, at best, a mediocre loyalty program, b) customer engagement is driven almost exclusively by a high rate of discounting, c) margins have declined since its introduction and d) sales continue to slide. Referring to customers as “members” may sound good, but it connotes a strength of relationship and value that clearly does not exist. The program has always been an expensive gimmick to collect customer data. Suggesting anything else defies credulity.

In an apparent attempt to distract from the collapse of its mall-based stores, Sears Holdings also continues to announce “innovative” new store formats like an appliance & mattress store (which isn’t a new idea at all) and a DieHard Battery Center. These might be interesting formats to franchise when Sears ceases to be a significant retail operator, but the notion they will somehow be material to a turnaround is just silly.

More broadly–and most stupefyingly–Lampert continues to claim turnaround efforts are on track. This from a company that has had precisely one-quarter of positive sales growth in seven years, operating losses that continue to worsen, an acceleration in store closings and rampant departures of key executives. Moreover, the moves detailed in the most recent press release are all about financial restructuring and say nothing about actions to improve customer relevance. If Sears does not quickly and dramatically improve its performance with its customers nothing else matters. Period.

At one level, I get why Lampert apparently chooses to create the illusion that Sears can actually stay in business. He needs vendors to keep shipping product to mitigate a complete unraveling. He needs employees to keep the lights on and greet the few customers who might wander into the ever shrinking store fleet. He needs to avoid looking too desperate to dodge fire sale pricing on the few remaining assets he must unload to make it through the holiday season. And he needs creditors to give him more time to try to pull another rabbit out of his hat.

Yet, let’s be clear, to believe that Sears is somehow going to make it much longer as anything remotely resembling a national, fully operating retailer is beyond folly. I have no idea whether Lampert truly believes Sears can be saved. I hope not because that would be quite sad.

But for the rest of us, there is simply no reason to be stupid or gullible. The reality is there for all to see. A story and, most importantly, the one spinning the tale–only has power if we allow them.

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.

Digital · Retail · Store closings

It’s the end of the mall as we know it . . . and I feel fine

For those promulgating the “retail apocalypse” narrative, a key component of their Chicken Little logic is that malls are dying. Moreover, much of the blame is cast squarely upon the growth of e-commerce. While hyperbole IS the greatest thing ever, there is a lot more to the story. So let’s try to put this all in a more fact-based, clear and nuanced perspective.

First, in aggregate, regional malls–and their department store anchors–have been on the decline for more than two decades. The first wave of disruption came from the advent and national expansion of big-box category killers and discount mass merchandisers. The most recent wave of disruption has come mostly from the rise of off-price and dollar stores. So while it’s convenient to blame Amazon, the ascent of online shopping is only a small piece of the puzzle. And due to rampant over-building, a correction was sure to come anyway.

Second, many dying malls are being killed by other malls. As growing retailers situate new stores in growing suburban areas with favorable demographics, we often witness a shift in an area’s “retail center of gravity.” A mall that was built in the 60’s or 70’s may lose relevance as more and more retailers locate closer to where a greater density of high spending shoppers now reside or work. In many instances, a new mall with more desirable tenants has been built during the past decade to capture those sales.

Third, many malls are actually doing very well.  The nation’s so-called “A” malls represent about 20% of locations, but generate about 75% of total mall volume. With few exceptions, these 270 or so malls have stellar (and growing) productivity and very low vacancy rates. Relatively few of these malls are being impacted by the closing of anchor tenants. And specialty store vacancies are typically snapped up quickly.

Fourth, while the closing of department stores is hitting “B” and “C” malls disproportionately hard, it’s not all bad news for mall owners. Sears has been a dead brand walking for more than a decade. Many JC Penney and Macy’s locations have been chronic under-performers for years. As long as these albatross tenants continue operating, the mall operator receives paltry rent from big chunks of their leasable space while generating little incremental traffic. So in reality the loss of poorly performing retailers is often creating new, more profitable opportunities. One scenario is a transformation of tenant mix, often a dramatic shift to more entertainment venues and/or professional office use.  Sometimes, non-traditional retail tenants (think Dick’s Sporting Goods or Target) become anchors. Yet another is a complete re-purposing of the entire center to more lucrative multi-use development.

This is not to say that some malls won’t die a painful death, never to return from the ashes. But the apocalyptic vision painted by some is far from accurate. Most higher-end malls will continue to thrive with an approach that looks rather familiar. Many others will evolve to be quite different, but will remain far from hurting, much less dead. Others will be radically transformed to something with a vastly higher and better use.

Either way, with few exceptions, investors, customers and employees are going to be just fine.

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.

Growth · Retail · Store closings

Shrinking To Prosperity: Can Store Closings Save Struggling Retailers?

It seems as if major store closing announcements are becoming a nearly daily occurrence. Earlier this week Michael Kors, the once high flying accessible luxury brand, announced it would close at least 100 stores over the next two years. They now join the ranks of Payless Shoes, Macy’s, JC Penney and a host of other major players that have recently decided to shutter a significant percentage of their store fleet.

In fact, some retailers are closing all of their stores hoping to thrive as an online only retailer. Bebe, Guess, Wet Seal and The Limited have all chosen to go this route–and it seems like both Sears and Radio Shack are headed there as well; they just haven’t made it official. In any event, if you want follow the action along at home my friends at Fung Global Retail maintain a store closing tracker.

While its clear that more and more struggling retailers are embracing a strategy to get much smaller, this ultimately begs the question whether it’s really possible to shrink your way to greatness.

Take a moment to make a list of brands (don’t worry, I’ll wait) that have intentionally walked away from a significant percentage of their revenue and been successful over the long-term. I’m not talking about conglomerates that have jettisoned under-performers in their portfolio or companies that have exited specific lines of business with challenging profitability. I’m talking about brands that have willingly stopped doing business in major geographies and/or with large numbers of core customers. It’s not easy it?

The truth is that it is far easier to name brands that closed stores merely as an intermediate step on their way to oblivion. Think Blockbuster and Borders (or Bradlee’s for you old timers). And that’s just the B’s. The retail graveyard is chock-a-block with once mighty merchants that spent years closing stores only to eventually succumb to the inevitable.

I have maintained for some time that when retailers start to close a lot of stores the issue is rarely that they have fundamentally too many outlets. Rather it’s that their value proposition is not sufficiently relevant and remarkable for the locations they have. We know that the notion that physical retail is dead is just silly. We know that plenty of “traditional” retailers are opening stores. Ulta, Sephora, Dollar General, Costco come readily to mind. We know that the hottest brands in retail–from giants like Amazon to specialty players like Warby Parker and Bonobo’s– are opening stores. We know that in most cases the economics of physical stores are superior to e-commerce. We know that the combination of digital AND physical is most often what customers want and what yields the best results. We know that it is virtually always the case that when retailers close stores their e-commerce revenues in the vacated trade area go down.

Clearly, on balance, there are too many stores. And for most retailers the size, configuration, operations and many fundamental aspects of the in-store experience must be changed, in some cases radically. Often the “need” to close stores is borne of desperation, propelled by multiple years of management neglect and failure to innovate. Often, as a practical matter, there is no choice, because there is no way to make up for the sins of the past in the here and now. While I cannot definitively say that mass store closings indicate the beginning of a downward spiral, I would definitely reject that notion that they are a panacea. And we absolutely shouldn’t conclude that such moves suggest a sustainable long-term strategy.

Over three years ago I posited that retailers were delusional if they thought that store closings would be their salvation. Today, as the pace of these closings accelerate, I still fundamentally reject the notion that more than a handful of brands can shrink their way to greatness. I hope I’m wrong.

michael-kors-closing-stores

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.

Agility · Customer Insight · Digital · e-commerce · Innovation · Store closings

Retail’s next punch in the face

Five years ago I wrote a post entitled: “The next punch in the face”, which you can read here.  I began by quoting noted retail legend Mike Tyson who allegedly said “everybody has a plan until they get punched in the face.” My point, more or less, was that in the world we live in, we’re going to get punched. Sometimes we’ll see it coming, sometimes we won’t. But we must be prepared and we must get our organizations to be more agile.

A few years later, after a successful trip to the Metaphor Store, I decided I needed a less violent but still powerful message to underscore how innovation and transformation were rippling through the industry, sometimes casting brands against the rocks like boats in the tempest.

So it seemed easy to borrow from Jack Kornfield, one of my favorite spirituality teachers. My updated message, dripping with stolen metaphor, was to point out that once we wade into the ocean, waves are inevitable and that to cope with that reality we are all going to have to learn to surf.

So what does any of this have to do with thriving in today’s environment? Well, if one looks at what’s happening to retail today that is highly disruptive, much of it may feel like a punch when it fully hits. The waves may seem unending and often violent. But here’s where the metaphors lose power and relevance.

We SHOULD have seen it coming. At least, most of it. Instead what we have is more slow motion car crash than retail apocalypse–despite what the pundits say.

A brand that’s been in business over 100 years suddenly has 20% or more of its total store base it needs to close immediately? That didn’t happen overnight.

A retailer that has tons of customer data and dozens, if not hundreds, of marketers wakes up one morning and discovers they are not ready for Millennials?

A retailer with masses of merchants, sophisticated planning software, consultants galore, misses sales and margin plans quarter after quarter? I guess they suddenly got a whole bunch of new customers they didn’t notice and know nothing about?

A CEO goes to a conference (or on CNBC) and “enlightens” the audience about how most in-store purchases are driven by digital and how a consumer that shops in multiple channels is most profitable and shopping needs to be seamless and blah, blah, blah. Sir, anyone who’s been paying attention at all has known this for years (too bad I didn’t save my presentation to the Neiman Marcus Board from 2007 to show you),

Most of the troubles afflicting major retailers, wholesale brands and the commercial real estate market have been obvious for years and their impact highly predictable. You can go look it up. I’ll wait.

If we were paying attention, if we were doing the hard, necessary work, if we were innovating, rather than just talking about innovation, if we accepted the inevitable realities of the marketplace, how could we not have acted?

Awareness.

Acceptance.

Action.

Accountability.

Rinse and Repeat.

The only real surprise is how some of these leaders still have their jobs given what lousy surfers they’ve turned out to be or how awful they were at seeing the punch coming.

Maybe they over-looked the really hard part of surfing?

Or maybe they just don’t know how to take a punch?

Either way, the next time someone says “wow, nobody saw this coming” chances are they were looking the wrong way all along or too busy riding the brake when they need to step on the gas.

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Omni-channel · Retail · Store closings

Wall Street’s Misguided (And Dangerous) Fascination With Retail Store Productivity

An unprecedented number of retail store locations are closing this year and more announcements are surely coming–though perhaps not quite as many as I suggested in my April Fool’s post.

Given the lack of innovation on the part of traditional retailers, rampant overbuilding and the disruptive nature of e-commerce, this ongoing and massive consolidation of retail space was both inevitable and overdue. Yet much of the way the investor community sees the need for even more aggressive store closings is wrong and, one could argue, pretty dangerous.

One of the more ridiculous ways Wall Street firms have tried to determine the “right” number of store closings is to calculate how many locations would need to be shuttered to return various chains to their 2006 store productivity levels. A somewhat more responsible, though still alarming, analysis comes from Cowen, which focused more on the need to more closely align retail selling space supply and demand.

The most obvious problem with this type of analysis is its focus on ratios. The fact is that many stores with below average productivity are still quite profitable, particularly department stores, given their low rent factors. So while closing a lot of locations may yield a temporary productivity boost it often has a direct and immediate negative impact on earnings, which is a far better indicator of a retailer’s health.

The bigger issue is an underlying misunderstanding of the role of brick & mortar stores in retail’s new world order. Just as “same-store” sales is an increasingly irrelevant metric, so are store productivity numbers. Yes, more stores need to close. Yes, many of the stores that remain need a major rethink with regard to their size and fundamental operations. But what many still fail to grasp is how a retailer’s store footprint drives a brand’s overall health and the success of its e-commerce operations.

A given store’s productivity can be below average and decline yet still contribute to a retailer’s overall success, particularly online. Stores serve as an important–and often low cost–channel to acquire new customers. Stores serve as showrooms that drive customers online. Stores serve as fulfillment points for e-commerce operations. Stores are billboards for a retail brand. Without a compelling store footprint, a brand’s relevance will likely decline and its e-commerce business almost certainly will falter. Stated simply, store productivity numbers, taken in isolation, no longer get at the heart of a brand’s overall performance in an omnichannel world.

While there surely is merit in closing stores that drain cash and management attention, store closings can often make a bad situation worse. Ironically–as Kevin Hillstrom from MineThatData does a great job of illustrating–closings stores to respond to e-commerce growth can actually have the opposite effect. In fact, from my experience, massive store closings often initiate (or at least signal) a coming downward spiral.

Store closings are hardly the panacea that Wall Street seems to believe. And the notion that a brand can shrink its way to prosperity is typically horribly misguided. Macy’s, J.C. Penney and a host of others need to close more stores. And Sears and Kmart just need to go away. But, as I’ve said many times before, show me a retailer that is closing a lot of stores and you’ve likely shown me a retailer that doesn’t have too many stores, but a retail brand that is no longer relevant enough for the stores it has.

The danger of closing too many stores is increasingly real. The danger that struggling retailers will continue to appease Wall Street’s thirst for taking an ax to store counts instead of working on the underlying fault in their stores seems, sadly, clear and present.

A version of this story recently appeared at Forbes, where I am a retail contributor. You can check out more of my posts and follow me here.