Out of Barneys’ rubble: What’s next for luxury fashion’s biggest boutique

Yesterday Barneys New York averted yet another trip to bankruptcy court through a major restructuring deal that converted most of their debt to equity (http://bloom.bg/IUyHir).

Unless you work at Istithmar–the PE firm that paid more than $940MM for Barneys in 2007 (oops!)–or owned Barneys debt, this is a big deal (pun intended). Barneys no longer has to divert the majority of its cash to service debt and now has greater capacity to improve existing operations and focus resources on growth.

So we’re good now, right? Not so fast.

To be sure, buying a marquee brand at fire sale prices sets up Barneys new class of equity owners for potentially high returns. And newish CEO Mark Lee has done a solid job of executing the basics and going after the proverbial low-hanging fruit. But we need to deal with a few facts.

We should not forget that Barneys recent improved performance comes at a time when virtually all luxury brands have performed well as the US market recovers from the devastating effects of the recession. As the market returns to 2007 levels–and we’re pretty much there–the reality is that the US luxury market is pretty mature.  Maintaining outsized revenue growth in the future is mostly going to need to come from market share gains and/or new stores.

The more looming reality is that Barneys is basically a 2 1/2 store chain. It’s no big secret that the New York and Beverly Hills stores drive the majority of profits while the Chicago flagship is a solid, but way less significant contributor. But expansions of flagship stores to markets like Scottsdale and Dallas have been disasters, and the Co-op stores have had decidedly mixed results.

Yes, Barneys expanded to markets like Las Vegas at precisely the worst time and yes, there have been execution follies along the way. But the bigger issue is that Barneys, as currently envisioned, is basically a big boutique. Unlike Neiman Marcus and Saks, which play in a full-range of affluent customer price points and target multiple lifestyles, Barney’s is tightly focused on a more specific customer from both a fashion point of view and price range.  In huge fashion markets like New York and LA, they can thrive. In smaller markets, faced with long-standing department store and boutique competition, it’s much, much harder.

Barneys has tried to correct for this by building smaller stores. While the stores are beautiful and contain a lot of great product, they mostly end up looking like a smaller boutique concept trying to fill up too big a space. So far, in markets like Dallas and Scottsdale, customers seem to agree.

For Barneys to profitably and meaningfully move beyond more than a handful of cities they are going to have to address a wider market while still maintaining a strong sense of their unique DNA and brand image. Faced with strong omni-channel competition like Saks, Neiman Marcus and Nordstrom–not to mention a whole host of e-commerce only players and local boutiques–that is no easy task.

 

 

Twitter’s birthday: Blow out the candles, step on the gas.

You probably heard that Twitter celebrated its 5th birthday yesterday.

The flash-sales model pioneered in the US by GiltGroupe is about 3 1/2 years old.

Groupon was founded in November of 2008, not even 2 1/2 years ago.

While it remains unclear whether Twitter will go the way of a MySpace or a Facebook, it’s hard to question that they have forever changed the way people communicate and engage.

The collective valuation of the flash-sale sites launched in the US is likely already greater than that of Saks Fifth Avenue, a pretty powerful brand that is more than 100 years old.

Groupon turned down an offer from Google to be bought for $6 billion and is rumored to be seeking a $25 billion valuation in an IPO later this year.

These innovative new business models are rapidly gaining share from industry incumbents who are slow to go through the cycle of awareness, acceptance and action.

If it hasn’t happened to your industry yet, rest assured it will.

So let’s all wish Twitter a Happy Birthday.

And then, go figure out whether you are driving the right car or not.

Either way, get ready to step on the gas.

 

Defying the Sea of Sameness

Any business school course on strategy will devote significant time to the importance of competitive differentiation.  We attend marketing conferences where speakers pontificate on the need to have a unique value proposition.  Excellent books like Seth Godin’s Purple Cow preach the benefits of being remarkable to separate yourself from the herd.

Yet any visit to the mall or surfing of the internet quickly reveals an often numbing “sea of sameness.”

This has long been true for many retailers.  But I believe the recession has made it worse.  As retailers have slashed inventory, desperate to demonstrate inventory productivity progress to investors, merchandise assortments have become less interesting, less differentiated, decidedly less remarkable.

By now it should be apparent that a full recovery is going to be slow in coming.  That means revenue growth must come primarily from stealing market share.

Now is the time to go on the offensive.  Now is the time to commit to deeply understanding your target customers’ needs, compromises and preferences and to find ways to innovate, to be truly remarkable.

For some companies, this means embracing the trusted agent role, going out into the market and curating a unique offering for a discerning clientele.  This is what the best specialty boutiques do.

For others, it means finding more exclusive products in the market, leveraging existing vendor relationships to construct a unique offering and/or developing their own compelling private brands.  This is happening across the price spectrum.  Kohl’s recently reported that 47% of revenues now come from exclusive products.  Saks Fifth Avenue is aggressively working to significantly increase its percentage of private label and national brand exclusives to differentiate itself in a challenging luxury market.

I think two basic principles are at work here.  First, a willingness to move away from a product-centric, gross margin rate maximization mind-set to embrace customer-centricity and all that entails.  Second, an acceptance that it is actually more risky to play it safe and swim in the sea of sameness.

Someone in your industry will decide to break away from the herd and gobble up share while the competition is on their heels.  What’s your choice?