I hope you will check out my new column for Colloquy, the leading source of publications, education and research for the loyalty industry. I am proud to serve as their luxury industry contributing editor.
I recently became Colloquy’s luxury retailing contributing editor.
As you may know, Colloquy is the go-to resource for loyalty intelligence with a publishing, education and research practice that brings together more than 50,000 loyalty practitioners from around the world. Colloquy is a division of Loyalty One.
Check out my first column by clicking on: Building Luxury Loyalty – Ditching the One-Size-Fits-All Strategy.
“Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better.”
- Samuel Beckett
If you pay attention to this sort of thing, you know that several months back Neiman Marcus and Target made a big splash when they announced a partnership to jointly market a limited collection of fashion items for the holidays. This announcement was followed by a lot of PR hoopla and a high-profile television and social media advertising campaign.
And guess what? It was a bust.
The product offering failed to generate the sales frenzy that past designer collaborations from Tar-zhay have, and the merchandise has been marked down 50 – 70%. The media are now out with their post-mortem bashings, many taking the “I knew it was a bad idea all along” route.
Having previously led strategy and corporate marketing at Neiman Marcus for several years, I’ve gotten plenty of questions about my take on the strategy and its execution (NOTE: full disclosure, I remain a Neiman’s investor). Frankly, I think much of the criticism misses the mark entirely.
Clearly, a lot of the execution was messed up. Prices were generally too high, designer brands were extended too broadly and some of the product was just plain goofy: a $50 Rag & Bone boys’ sweater? That was never a good idea.
Big picture, however, the concept was fundamentally good for both Target and Neiman’s. Target is well-known for enhancing its fashion cred with such partnerships; so for them, this was a no-brainer. If they made any money on it, all the better. But the real value is in brand enhancement.
For Neiman Marcus, the strategic value may be less obvious but, in essence, their foray into “mass-tige” is no different from Karl Lagerfeld or Jimmy Choo doing their special offerings at H&M. The goal is to generate buzz and expose their brands to a demographic that they need to cultivate for the long-term. Forging a longer-term and/or more broad partnership would be dumb. But experiments, such as what was tried here, can be shrewd moves indeed.
Which brings me to my last point. What gratifies me the most is that Neiman’s actually tried something bold and, arguably, counter-intuitive. Neiman Marcus’ last CEO–and my former boss–Burt Tansky was a brilliant merchant and remains a luxury and fashion industry icon–and rightly so. But he was hardly a risk-taker and fundamentally not wired to say ‘yes’ to strategic innovation. Kudos to Karen Katz and her team for being willing to push the envelope.
It’s so very easy to label something a failure after the fact and to castigate management for its ineptitude. The far easier path for leaders of course is to never try. You rarely get criticized for the things you didn’t do.
It’s a terrible strategy to eliminate the possibility of failure. Great companies and great leaders are not characterized by an absence of failure.
Without trying, there is no growth. Without failure, there is no learning. The key is to fail better.
So was the Neiman Marcus and Target partnership a failure? In the immediate-term, definitely. But the overall grade from where I sit is “Incomplete.”
If the lesson Neiman Marcus takes away from this project–and it is a project, not a strategy–is to pull back on innovation, to stop experimenting, than it will be a huge waste of time and resources. If it strengthens their resolve, if they apply their learning to improve the process of innovation, than it will be the most glorious of failures.
Yesterday Barneys New York averted yet another trip to bankruptcy court through a major restructuring deal that converted most of their debt to equity (http://bloom.bg/IUyHir).
Unless you work at Istithmar–the PE firm that paid more than $940MM for Barneys in 2007 (oops!)–or owned Barneys debt, this is a big deal (pun intended). Barneys no longer has to divert the majority of its cash to service debt and now has greater capacity to improve existing operations and focus resources on growth.
So we’re good now, right? Not so fast.
To be sure, buying a marquee brand at fire sale prices sets up Barneys new class of equity owners for potentially high returns. And newish CEO Mark Lee has done a solid job of executing the basics and going after the proverbial low-hanging fruit. But we need to deal with a few facts.
We should not forget that Barneys recent improved performance comes at a time when virtually all luxury brands have performed well as the US market recovers from the devastating effects of the recession. As the market returns to 2007 levels–and we’re pretty much there–the reality is that the US luxury market is pretty mature. Maintaining outsized revenue growth in the future is mostly going to need to come from market share gains and/or new stores.
The more looming reality is that Barneys is basically a 2 1/2 store chain. It’s no big secret that the New York and Beverly Hills stores drive the majority of profits while the Chicago flagship is a solid, but way less significant contributor. But expansions of flagship stores to markets like Scottsdale and Dallas have been disasters, and the Co-op stores have had decidedly mixed results.
Yes, Barneys expanded to markets like Las Vegas at precisely the worst time and yes, there have been execution follies along the way. But the bigger issue is that Barneys, as currently envisioned, is basically a big boutique. Unlike Neiman Marcus and Saks, which play in a full-range of affluent customer price points and target multiple lifestyles, Barney’s is tightly focused on a more specific customer from both a fashion point of view and price range. In huge fashion markets like New York and LA, they can thrive. In smaller markets, faced with long-standing department store and boutique competition, it’s much, much harder.
Barneys has tried to correct for this by building smaller stores. While the stores are beautiful and contain a lot of great product, they mostly end up looking like a smaller boutique concept trying to fill up too big a space. So far, in markets like Dallas and Scottsdale, customers seem to agree.
For Barneys to profitably and meaningfully move beyond more than a handful of cities they are going to have to address a wider market while still maintaining a strong sense of their unique DNA and brand image. Faced with strong omni-channel competition like Saks, Neiman Marcus and Nordstrom–not to mention a whole host of e-commerce only players and local boutiques–that is no easy task.
You probably know the saying: “If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”
This explains a lot of behavior we see with the leadership at struggling retailers.
If you came up through the merchant ranks, chances are you obsess about product–rather than the consumer–and fall woefully behind in creating a compelling omni-channel shopping experience. Today, you are desperately playing catch-up.
If the only way you know to drive revenue is through relentless price promotions, you now sit lamenting the lack of customer loyalty and your shrinking margins.
If you made your money through financial re-engineering and scorched earth expense reductions, you assume your latest investment will cost cut its way to prosperity, rather than realize that your overwhelming issue is top-line growth (I’m looking at you Eddie Lampert!).
If you drove same-store sales through price increases rather than customer and transaction growth–as the US luxury retail industry did for many years–post-recession you find yourself with too narrow a customer base to sustain profitable growth. You now are working overtime to win back customers you priced out of your brand.
All of these problems were caused by a monolithic view of strategy and a failure to gain deep insight into customer behavior. Most were preventable.
Of course, the past is history and the future is a mystery.
But there is no mystery in the failed wisdom of clinging to the past and continually wielding the hammer that got you into trouble in the first place.
Get some new tools.
#1 “Crazy Eddie and Sears’ Hail Mary Pass.” http://bit.ly/e0p88l.
#2 “The end of same store sales.” bit.ly/vlUXVO.
#3 “Luxury’s back! Uh, not so fast.” bit.ly/rFrgNj.
#4 “Let’s get small.” bit.ly/mT63sD.
#5 “Get over it. Get used to it. Get on with it.” bit.ly/dFn1wf.
#6 “The showroom of death.” bit.ly/tJPfoZ
#7 “Me-tail.” bit.ly/rfBu1B
#8 “Zip it, your generation is showing.” bit.ly/e77Cs4
#9 “Playing not to lose.” bit.ly/sjOTQN
#10 “The endless aisle and the world’s smallest parking lot.” bit.ly/ryxv3C
Thanks to the so-called flash-sales sites we now have a distorted definition of what being a member means. Before Gilt, RueLaLa and the myriad “private” e-commerce business wanna-bees, gaining membership in something typically meant you needed to actually do something more than have an email address and a pulse.
By now it should be clear to everyone that membership to these sites is simply a marketing gimmick. And an effective one at that.
But beyond semantics, the key issue is really how many of these members are actually customers? And of the actual customers, how many have bought more than once in the last year and how many are actually profitable (or have the potential to be)? You don’t have to tumble too many numbers to realize how shallow the customer base for most of these sites must be.
With competition heating up, and overall core sector growth flattening, it won’t be long before some investors become quite unhappy indeed.