Oh, they’re not a competitor

Shortly after I became the head of strategy and multi-channel marketing at The Neiman Marcus Group I was asked to lead a strategic planning session for our senior executives. One of the exercises I suggested was a deep dive on our opportunities and vulnerabilities against each of our key competitors. As I reviewed my overall plan one of the top leaders responded, “I like the overall approach, but you need to take Nordstrom off your list. They’re not a competitor.”

Having come to Neiman’s after 12 years at Sears–which I affectionately call my journey from the outhouse to the penthouse–I will admit that my experience in the nuances of the luxury industry was pretty lacking at that point. I certainly understood that a substantial percentage of our customers were fabulously wealthy and preferred brands that you simply could not get at Nordstrom. But I had already learned that many of our shoppers were much less affluent and that we sold quite a few brands that overlapped. Nevertheless, being the new guy–and not especially confident in my hypotheses–I acquiesced. We didn’t talk about Nordstrom.

About a year later my team initiated an in-depth analysis of customer spending and activity trends. Ultimately what we found was pretty disturbing. While our very top spending group was growing in sales and margin rate, customers that represented about 2/3 of our sales had weakening stats.

As it turned out, virtually all our sales growth during the preceding 5 years was driven by raising our average unit prices and the growth of our e-commerce business. After much hemming and hawing about the value (and cost) of doing consumer research, we finally got approval to do a series of studies to understand the underlying drivers of these outcomes. We learned a lot, most of which Neiman’s failed to act upon until the financial crisis hit. But the overwhelming conclusion was that when we lost customers (or a portion of a customer’s spending) the majority of that leakage was to Nordstrom.

Oops.

The point of this story is not to point out the limitations of the Neiman’s culture at that time, nor the power of my intuition. The fact is you don’t have to do much digging to find similar examples of mis-reading the consumer and failing to respond adequately playing out, over and over again, in any and all parts of industry.

Sometimes competition is rather direct even when there is a major value proposition innovation. Flash-sale sites clearly competed for a certain segment of the fashion business. Digital books and music obviously challenged the underlying business models of Borders and Blockbuster.

Sometimes competition might be less direct and its game-changing impact may be harder to glean at first. I’m not sure what the brand management teams at Folger’s and Maxwell House were thinking during the initial growth of Starbucks, but it’s now clear that there was a dramatic consumer preference shift that those brands failed to address–and a huge value creation opportunity that they didn’t participate in.

Even harder to see is when consumers have a more macro-substitution effect. For example, with some consumer segments, we’ve seen a broad and long-term trend to greater interest in personal experiences. This shift has, in many cases, supplanted spending on certain physical goods.

As in most elements of good strategy development the keys are pretty simple:

  • Clearly articulate a data-supported and trackable customer segmentation scheme
  • Stay current on the wants, needs and long-term value of each of those segments
  • Monitor direct competitors and emerging competitors for EACH segment
  • Model impact scenarios for nascent opportunities and threats
  • Develop potential responses and testing plans under each of those scenarios
  • When the time is right test those responses
  • Assume the time is right much earlier than seems comfortable
  • Be prepared to compete with yourself.

And one more thing. If someone tells you “Oh, they’re not a competitor” you might not want to take their word on it.

In God we trust, all others must bring data.

 

Wall Street’s simple, surefire–and mostly wrong–strategy to fix retail

Show me a struggling retailer and I’ll tell you what many Wall Street analysts will say is that company’s quickest path to new-found prosperity. Close stores. Or better yet, close a whole bunch of stores.

This was supremely evident with the frenzy that erupted on Twitter prior to JC Penney’s Analyst Day last week. Here’s a paraphrased exchange I had with one “famous”–mostly for posting photos of crappy Sears stores–Wall St. type.  Note: this is highly edited and paraphrased for brevity (and perhaps levity).

HIM: Penney’s is about to announce a bunch of store closings.

ME: I doubt it.

HIM: But they must close stores, lots and lots of stores!

ME: No they don’t. (I proceed to tell him why).

HIM: You don’t understand. They must close stores, lots and lots of stores! They need to have the same number of stores as Macy’s!

ME: That’s dumb.

HIM: You’re dumb.

The Analyst Day presentation concludes. Penney’s announces no store closings.

ME: I don’t want to say ‘I told you so’ but…

HIM: Hey, want to see my photos of really crappy Sears stores?

Now don’t get me wrong. Overall, the retail industry is over-stored. And the growth of e-commerce is causing a fundamental re-think of the number of stores a retailer requires, the size (and configuration) of these stores and how these stores need to operate. A contraction and re-working of gross retail space is inevitable.

But the knee-jerk reaction in favor of wholesale store closings is focused on the wrong problem. Struggling chains like Radio Shack and Sears aren’t in dire trouble because they have too much retail space. They are struggling because their overall value proposition isn’t working. If Radio Shack and Sears had a business model that was fundamentally sound, their needed store count overtime wouldn’t necessarily be dramatically different from what they have today. Show me a nationally branded, omni-channel retailer that is closing a lot of stores and I’ll show you one that is likely on the way to extinction.

What many on Wall Street often don’t get is that the cost of real estate for many of these established retailers is really quite low, making it easy for even chronically low productivity stores to be cash positive. And while Wall Street likes to cite the growth in e-commerce as the reason why store counts need to shrink dramatically, the reality is that for any decently integrated retailer, stores help drive the online business–and vice versa. Total customer and cross-channel economics need to be taken into account when doing a store closing analysis. When you do this analysis, along with the cash flow calculations, it turns out that closing a lot of store often makes things worse.

As for JC Penney, they are certainly far from out of the woods. They have a ton of work to do to refine and execute a merchandising and customer experience strategy that can regain share in an intensely competitive sector of the market. They are rightly focused on honing a new brand positioning and strengthening their omni-channel capabilities. My educated guess–having done this sort of analysis for other department store retailers–is that with conservative sales growth assumptions, only around 5% of Penney’s stores would be sensible candidates for near-term closure. Penney’s management is likely watching this list closely as they see how new strategies take root and they better understand the omni-channel effect.

For me, if Penney’s were to announce a large number of stores closings in the next year–say 75 or more–it wouldn’t be evidence that they are smart managers, it would be a sign that their overall strategy isn’t working.

 

 

No customer wants to be average

It’s only when our experience is terrible that we’d settle for average treatment. But what customer truly wants to be average?

average person

Most of the time, we hope brands know us, show us they know us and show us they value us.

And to do that, companies need to break out of a one-size-fits-all paradigm.

It’s not easy. Which is why so many stores are still filled with average products for average people and our mailboxes–virtual and otherwise–are chock-a-bloc with largely irrelevant pitches and promotions.

It also feels safe, even though it’s anything but. Relying on newspaper circulars and big TV ad campaigns and “Super Saturdays” and the same promotional calendar we ran last year, may bathe us in the warm water of familiarity, but more and more mass marketing strategies are delivering less and less.

Getting closer to the customer–making the choice to treat different customers differently–needs to be more than a slogan. It means busting the silos that get in the way of a unified and seamless experience. It means investing in deeper customer insight and the tools and techniques to deliver progressively more personalized interactions. It means embracing a test and learn mentality.

Mostly, it means radical acceptance of the reality that, for most brands, the only way to grow faster than average is to eschew the average.

 

Valued or a value?

Most executives will tell you that, regardless of the price point of their product or service, their customer considers what they offer a good value.

At one level, that’s obvious. Both the Dollar Store shopper and the Ferrari buyer must believe that the sum total of the benefits they are receiving exceeds the total cost they are incurring–or why else would they each part with their time and money?

While this sort of left brain thinking is important, powerful, enduring brands deliver something more. Brands that offer a deeper, emotional connection are able to transcend the occasional misstep. They are able to drive their business without layering on endless discounts. Their loyalty is earned not bought. Their customers’ testimony is their best advertising.

When a brand is intrinsically valued by the consumer, the entire relationship operates on a different plane.

Alternatively, if the customer fundamentally sees your brand as “a value” you had better have the sharpest price or the most compelling promotion. You also better be the low-cost competitor. Otherwise,  the inevitable race to the bottom is likely to end badly.

Oh, and if you’re having a hard time figuring out which you are, that’s an even bigger problem.

 

 

 

The end of scarcity

For a long, long time, scarcity propped up and protected a lot of brands.

Scarcity of information. If I wanted to learn about your product or service I had to go to your store, meet with your salesperson or see what a neighbor or friend had to say. Other sources simply didn’t exist or required an unreasonable amount of time and effort on my part.

Scarcity of trust agents. If I needed objective data on product performance, customer service or whether your price was fair, there was Consumer Reports–which came out in print monthly–and not a whole lot more.

Scarcity of access. With consumer brands, the product was either carried in a store near me or it wasn’t. When it came to retail options, there was either a store convenient to me or not. And one could only buy things during “regular business hours.” Mail order catalogs mitigated some of this, but were never large factors in most categories.

Scarcity of competition for attention. Marketing messages were delivered mostly through a fairly limited set of broadcast media, print and direct marketing channels. And the brand got to control the composition, breadth and frequency of communication. The signal to noise ratio was favorable.

Scarcity of substitutes. Launching and growing a new product typically meant investing in large marketing budgets along with huge cash commitments to inventory and to build out physical locations. Few competitors could afford to play this game.

And so on.

Today, the sources for product and pricing information are nearly endless.

Today, hundreds, if not thousands, of digital sites provide virtually real-time data on brand performance and the best pricing.

Today, e-commerce has enabled an explosion of choice and, often,  the ability to access products around the world, 24/7. Products and services that can be delivered digitally have made physical access and store hours completely irrelevant.

Today, there is an overwhelming amount of competition for our time and attention. Share of attention is becoming the scarce commodity.

Today, many brands can be launched with minimal investment in marketing and/or physical capital, which has led to many flavors and varieties of alternative choices for consumers to choose from.

As scarcity has ebbed, the vulnerabilities of many brands have been exposed. And for some it has already ended badly.

When the scarcity that protected your brand goes away, you can no longer get away with selling average products for average people.

The only sensible choice is to build something truly relevant and remarkable.

I’d hurry if I were you.

 

The discount ring

I’m amazed that Wall Street analysts are “surprised” that as hot brands get bigger (think Michael Kors, kate spade), their level of discounting increases. Apparently they were all sleeping during their first year economics course when supply and demand was covered.

Target_market_bullseye

 

 

 

 

 

Whether it’s Walmart or Chanel, at the center of any brand’s customer bullseye will be customers who don’t need a discount (or any extra incentive) to buy. This is what I referred to in my recent obsessive core post. As we move out in the rings, away from the center, we encounter customer segments that are less and less intrinsically loyal and thus more in need of extra incentives to buy.

Since Walmart’s value proposition is largely about price–whereas Chanel’s rests on a high percentage of full-price selling–the composition and dynamics of these various customer segment rings will obviously be quite different. But the fact remains that as a brand grows by casting a wider net for customers it will, at some point, develop a discount ring.

As the name implies, customers in the discount ring don’t buy unless they get a deal. In fact, most brands will have multiple discount rings. There will be a ring that needs only minor or modest incentives to pull the trigger. Others only come off the sidelines when prices hit a much deeper level of markdown (or some other incentive).

Unless we are examining a brand that has decided strategically to shun price discounting completely–or assessing certain companies early in their life-cycle–the existence (and relative growth) of a discount ring should surprise no decent analyst.

The real question for anyone trying to understand the validity of a brand’s long-term customer growth strategy is whether the company has a firm grasp of the dynamics within each of these rings and is intelligently balancing the portfolio of these different customer segments.

Coach is a brand that in recent years lost its grip on its customer portfolio and pushed too far on the discount ring. They have paid a steep price and are now trying to rebalance.

In Michael Kors’ case, there are only so many customers willing to pay at or close to full-price for their core offering. Sustaining growth means appealing to more customers. And that means they will need to become more reliant on more price sensitive customers.

Ultimately the point at which the discount ring becomes meaningful is mostly a matter of brand maturity and math. If you get shocked by that it just means you’re not paying attention.

The starting point–the pivotal matter of strategy and intelligent customer development–is to build a level of deep insight about each relevant customer segment. Then we must become intentional about how each plays into the brand’s long-term growth. Having a discount ring emerge is not automatically a matter of good or bad. How it plays out over time is a strategic choice.

Choose wisely.

The obsessive core

Every great brand has an obsessive core. The person who camps out for hours before the next iPhone is released. The Harley Davidson fanatic who sports the logo tattoo and is dressed head to toe in Harley gear. The frequent shopper who willingly pays full price and is an incredible source of great word of mouth. The raving fan. You get the picture.

The great thing about most obsessive core customers is that they are highly profitable and help acquire new customers at a low-cost. If you lack such a passionate group, chances are you are making average products for average people. Good luck with that.

Yet brands blessed with an obsessive core–or even a bit less enthusiastic but significant group of “heavy-users”–are often led astray.

Many luxury brands–including my former employer Neiman Marcus–tilted too heavily towards their obsessive core shopper and neglected other important, profitable customer segments. When the recession hit, the day of reckoning was harsh indeed.

Most high-flying e-commerce companies gain their initial traction with an obsessive core. By focusing on an underserved niche that loves to shop online, these brands can often quickly and cost effectively acquire thousands of profitable customers. Alas, as we’re starting to see with many companies that have attracted millions in venture capital funding, growing profitably beyond that initial core is not so easy.

Unfortunately, the factors that create the obsessive core, the raving fan, the incredibly passionate brand advocate, often cannot be scaled.

Unfortunately, in our quest to exploit the seductive virtues of the obsessive core, we can lose sight of the big picture.

The key, I think, is to not let ourselves become obsessed with this group, but to place them in the appropriate context.